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ABSTRACT
Traditionally, the literature on transportation investment in
developing countries has concentrated on the study of the relationships
between socio-economic issues and investment and planning strategies in
the sector; little attention has nevertheless been paid to the relation
that exists between regulatory policies and transport investment in less
developed countries. Poor understanding of this link has led in numerous
instances to an incorrect diagnosis of transportation problems and to
often unnecessary and/or inefficient investment outlays. In our opinion
therefore, both international development agencies and financial insti-
tutions and national transport planning authorities in less developed
countries would greatly benefit from a more comprehensive insight into
the interrelationships that exist between regulatory policies and
on how they affect investment in transportation in developing countries.
Chapter 1 will review previous work and advances in the analysis
and evaluation of transport investment in less developed countries, and
will investigate the relationships that exist between transportation
regulation and investment in the sector.
Chapter 2 will review the different theories of economic regulation
that have been established in the literature of public utility and will
evaluate their applicability and adaptability to the regulation of the
transport sector in less developed countries.
Chapter 3 will analyze the effects of both market and operating
transportation regulations on the level, distribution and composition
of investment in the sector in developing countries, with particular
emphasis on the case of the Arab Republic of Egypt.
Finally, Chapter 4 will summarize the results and develop
recommendations for future analysis and evaluation of transport invest-
ment strategies in the LDC's.
Name and Title of Thesis Supervisor: Fred Moavenzadeh, Professor
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1. INTRODUCTION
The existence of a rather close correlation between transportation
and socio-economic development is by now considered to be an axiom both
in the case of developed and developing countries. The fact that
comprehensive transportation investment programs are a necessary
condition for overall economic development has been amply demon-
strated by past experience in many less developed countries and by
substantial overestimation of expected benefits of development programs
which failed to take this factor into account and which obtained
results that were rather modest when compared with the "a priori"
benefit analysis.
As pointed out by Owen (1968) though, the dangers of excessive
concern with the transport sector, and the consequent neglect of
other complementary investment areas, should be emphasized. Improve-
ments in the country's transportation network will not "per se"
necessarily boost economic development if they are not comple-
mented by additional investment in areas such as fertilizer and
machinery production, irrigation, capital expansion, tax breaks,
technical and credit assistance, training and education.
Improvements in the transport sector are therefore a necessary but
not sufficient condition for overall socio-economic development; on the
one hand relative underinvestment vis-a-vis other sectors will consider-
ably, if not totally, reduce the effectiveness of development programs;
on the other hand relative overinvestment in transportation should be
carefully avoided since it causes a major waste of scarce, high oppor-
tunity cost, capital resources.
Developing countries have traditionally invested a considerable
share of their available capital in the transport sector; in 1977, for
example, 14.8% of all lending by the World Bank and the International
Development Association to developing countries was destined to the
transport sector. Its share was second only to that of the agricultural
sector which has generally been an important recipient of funds from
these organizations in the past and which very often covers transport
related investments such as rural road development programs. [World Bank
(1977)]
The importance of the transport sector in less developed countries
has also been amply recognized in the literature on transportation in-
vestment analysis and transport project evaluation where considerable
effort has been devoted in recent years to the improvement and develop-
ment of analytical tools on the subject.
1.1 A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF PREVIOUS TRANSPORT INVESTMENT STUDIES IN
LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES.
A review of the literature on transport investment in less
developed countries [Irwin (1975)] shows that even though considerable
work has been devoted to the analysis of the relationships between
socio-economic issues and investment and planning strategies in
the transportation sector and substantial advances have been made in
improving transport investment analysis methodologies, little attention
has been paid to the relation that exists between the institutional
and regulatory environment and investment in the transport sector in
developing countries.
As a review of literature suggests, no significant body of
work exists presently on the analysis of the relationships that exist
between institutional and regulatory policies and investment in the
transportation sector in less developed countries; most transport
investment studies in LDC's have been conducted in an institutional
and regulatory "vacuum". This isolation of the transport sector from
institutional and regulatory issues has led in numerous instances to
an incorrect diagnosis of transportation problems and to often un-
necessary and/or inefficient investment outlays.
As a result, both national transport institutions and inter-
national lending and development agencies have realized the importance
of becoming involved not only in the funding and evaluation of new
investment projects involving construction of infrastructure but,
in addition, in the analysis of the institutional and regulatory (as
well as socio-economic) issues and process that have made these invest-
ment outlays necessary.
In our opinion, therefore, both international development agencies
and financial institutions and national transport planning authorities
would greatly benefit from a more comprehensive insight into the links
that exist between regulatory structures and investment strategies
in the sector.
There are basically two questions that are very relevant in the
analysis of these links:
* To what extent have transport regulations
contributed to present shortcomings and problems
in the system and how have they affected past
investment strategies?
* What will be the impact of specific changes in
regulations on transport investment decisions?
The first question relates to the fact that the appearance of
bottlenecks and deficiencies in the transportation network cannot be
solely attributed to a shift in demand determined by socio-economic
development or to scarcity of available capital resources. Very
often the argument is made in developing countries that these bottle-
necks could be avoided, or at least considerably reduced, if only
planning capabilities in the sector were improved and sufficient
capital investment funds made available.
The fact is that capital resources are scarce in developing,
as well as in developed, countries; the problem is therefore not
one of expanding resource availability exclusively but, rather, one
of improving the allocation of existing capital inputs so as to
minimize present and future bottlenecks. Naturally, better planning
should contribute to an improved allocation process; but it is
important to realize that it will do so only to the extent that its
results are reflected in the government's transportation policies
and regulatory structure.
It is therefore important to identify, in addition to
deficiencies in transportation planning, the discrepancies between
stated transport planning objectives and existing regulatory
structures that have led to the development of problems in the
transportation system. Considerable insight into this question can
be thus gained from an "ex post" analysis of how regulations have
affected transport investment in less developed countries and how
this effect has contributed to existing transportation shortcomings.
Once the nature of this relationship is established, the
impact of specific changes in regulations on transport investment
decisions can be anticipated; it is then possible to add a new
regulatory dimension to the analysis of transport investment problems.
This dimension can be developed for any particular transport deficiency
along the following lines:
* What regulations, if any, have contributed
to the development of the problem?
* Is direct government investment really needed
to improve the situation or would a change in
regulations suffice to generate private investment
that would correct the problem?
* What regulatory changes should be made so as to
affect investment decisions in a way that
would preclude the recurrence of the problem?
* What are investment areas and directions could
be created by a better understanding of the
institutional and regulatory environment?
1.2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THIS STUDY
This study will primarily focus on the analysis of both market and
operating regulatory policies and on how they may affect transportation
investment in developing countries.
Chapter 2 will review the different theories of economic regu-
lation that have been established in the literature of public utility
regulation and will evaluate their applicability and adaptability to
the regulation of the transport sector in less developed countries.
In particular, we will cover the public interest theory and several
of its reformulations, the capture theory of regulation and the eco-
nomic theory of regulation.
Chapter 3 will analyze the effects of market regulation on capital/
output ratios, market expansion, level of service and technological
innovation in transportation and will particularly concentrate on
the application of the obtained theoretical results to railroad-truck
competition in Egypt. In addition, the issues involved in the imple-
mentation of three operating regulations - axle load limitations, total
truck weight limits and truck size specifications will be considered.
Finally, Chapter 4 will summarize the results and develop
recommendations for future analysis and evaluation of transport
investment strategies in LDC's.
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(1)
The recent literature on transport investment in less developed
countries covers the relationship between investment in transportation
and socio-economic development [Blain and Rushing (1965), Carnemark
and Biderman (1976), Felstehaussen (1971), Fromm (1965), Haefele (1969),
Kraft (1971), Moavenzadeh (1974), Owen (1968,1969), Sen (1974),
Stokes (1968), Walters ( )]; the effects of transport investment
on regional growth [DeSalvo (1973), Lefeber (1965), Soberman (1966),
U.N. (1972); transportation policy and its formulation [Docwr (1971)
Gilmore and Dilson (1971), Rommer (1971)]; transport planning methodo-
logies [Adler (1970), Beenhakker (1973), Burns (1969), Kresge and
Roberts (1971), Kulp (1970), Meyer and Strazheim (1971), Moavenzadeh
et al (1977), Slinn (1971), Stokes (1968)]; choice of technology and
mode [Castaline (1973), Cheany (1968), Harral et al (1974), Jones
(1973), Koshal (1970), Mutsaers (1968), Roberts (1971), U.N. (1970),
U.S.A.I.D. (1970c)]; transportation and urban planning [Isard and
Liossat-os (1972), Lim (1974), , . .: , ^ ' , *' '7 . , ..... 1- . ,
";Io-', -. r "7 :r.nsroratic:, :I 's a n1 -1 qar. .stu t]s _1 Q T r
(1970a) U.S.A.I.D. (1970b), U.S.A.I.D. (1972), U.S.A.I.D. (1973),
World Bank (1971)]; and transport models [World Bank (1970), Bronzini
(1974), DeNeufville et al (1973), Harral et al (1970), Manheim (1973),
Miller (1970), Moavenzadeh et al (1971), Roberts et al (1968)].
2.0 THEORIES OF ECONOMIC REGULATION
2.1 DIFFERENT FORMS OF REGULATION
Regulations in general and transport regulations in particular
can be usually classified in two main categories: those designed to
affect primarily the structure and other characteristics of the market
in which the firms operate - market regulations - and those destined to
influence the operation of firms within that market - operating
regulations. Naturally, market regulations will very often have effects
on the operation of firms and operating regulations will modify market
characteristics; it should be nevertheless emphasized that these are
secondary effects which, even though very often considered at the time
of the design of a regulatory policy, are, in general, not the primary
objective being pursued by the implementation of said policy.
Our classification of regulatory policies is therefore based on
the primary objective being sought by the legislature or the relevant
government agency through its introduction rather than on secondary
effects that this policy might have in the end.
2.1.1 Market Regulations
The structure of government market regulation is generally con-
structed on four basic types of policies which jointly work towards
the achievement of the objectives that the government intends to attain
through the regulation of a particular market. These four basic types
of policies are:
e Regulation of entry into and exit from a
market; entry and exit are therefore
limited to firms which meet a set of conditions
put forward by the responsible government agency.
* Regulation of price levels in that particular
market to check the monopolistic or oligopolistic
power that has been conferred to the firms operating
in it by the imposed restrictions on free entry
and exit.
* Control of rate of return on capital investment
for the firms operating in the market to ensure
a "fair" regulated price.
* Taxes and subsidies to correct discrepancies
between the desired "fair" rate of return and
the one resulting from the set price level.
These may be needed when objectives other than a
reasonable rate of return on capital are taken
into consideration when determining the regulated
price level.
Regulations in these four categories can take different forms,
depending on the particular industry and market being considered
and on the secondary goals that are pursued through their imple-
mentation. A brief and clearly not exhaustive list of different
policies of the four types is provided here for purposes of
illustration.
Entry Regulations
* Licensing
* Concession of operating authority
* Entry minimum capital level requirements
* Entry minimum service requirements
* Entry permit conditional to service of other market
* Private/Public market share constraints
Exit Regulations
* Obligation to service under operating authority
* Exit minimum service requirements
* Interconnection of separate market licensing
Price Regulations
* Exogenously determined price level
* Cost-related level of price linked to rate of
return regulation
e Free price linked to parametric profit tax
levels determined by rate of return regulation
e Cross subsidization of markets
* Exogenously determined price level with negative
(positive) profit linked to subsidy (tax) level
determined by rate of return regulation.
Taxes and Subsidies
* Taxes and subsidies applied to profit component
linked to rate of return regulation.
* Taxes and subsidies on specific inputs
* Taxes and subsidies on specific markets
Rate of Return Regulation
Determination of minimum/maximum rate of return interval
coupled with an appropriate price cum tax cum subsidy policy.
2.1.2 Operating Regulations
While market regulations are generally based on economic
efficiency or public economic interest considerations, operating
regulations are usually closely related to operating and safety
characteristics of the particular industry and on issues arising
from its effects on other social sectors such as labor and the
environment. Thus, while market regulations can be analyzed abstractly
in terms of the problems of economics and public interest that are
common to all relevant industries, operating regulations are much
more conveniently evaluated in the context of the specific industry
being considered.
In the particular case of transportation, operating regulations
can be classified in four basic, not totally exclusive, categories:
* Service regulations specifying the minimum standards
and safety requirements demanded in the provision
of a given service in a particular market.
* Equipment regulations detailing the performance
and safety standards of equipment to be used
in the provision of the service.
* Labor regulations determining safety
requirements and minimum compensation
for personnel to be employed in the
production of the service.
* Environmental regulations controlling the
levels of deterioration of the environment
caused by externalities of the service.
Some examples of regulations in these four categories for
the transport sector are given in the list below.
Service Regulations
* Minimum frequency of service standards
* Minimum quality of service requirements (time, time
reliability, product deterioration standards)
* Maximum speed on a link
* Maximum load factor
e Maximum weight limit
* Axle load limitation
Equipment Regulations
* Minimum power requirements
* Equipment safety standard's
* Vehicle size limitations
* Minimum maintenance requirements
Labor Regulations
* Minimum wages
* Minimum crew requirements
* Maximum work time limitations
e Labor safety standards
Environmental Regulations
* Fuel emission standards
* Noise level standards
In order to evaluate the effects of regulation on transportation
it is important to understand not only the changes that regulation
has brought about in investment strategies (the costs or indirect
benefits of regulation) but also the expected direct benefits or ob-
jectives that are pursued by the government agencies when imposing
regulation on an industry (the anticipated direct benefits of regulation).
It is therefore important to gain some insight into the economic and
public interest motives for regulation before attempting to investi-
gate or evaluate its effects on investment in the sector.
To be sure, government control is not restricted exclusively to
the so-called "regulated" industries. The government influences
the functioning of the competitive sectors of the economy in many
ways as well; be it through monetary and fiscal policy, by enforcing
contract law, by levying taxes, by setting safety and product stan-
dards, or simply by guaranteeing labor's rights to union association
or collective bargaining. This role is nevertheless conceived as one
of maintaining the framework and the institutions within which com-
petitive markets can continue to function; the influence of its
actions, however strong, are intended to operate at the periphery
of the affected markets and to correct the imperfections of competition,
rather than supplanting it. In these sectors government does not,
or at least is not supposed to, directly affect the structure of the
market (by controlling entry into and exit from it) or the
production decisions within it (by controlling prices and guaranteeing
service) or the flow of investment (by determining and fixing rates
of return on capital).
The role and the objectives of the government in relation to the
so-called "regulated" industries is therefore clearly beyond aiding
or facilitating the functioning of the economic system and very much
a result of an apparent desire to effectively control all aspects -
both market-related and operating - of a specific industry. The
question therefore arises of why should the government want to regulate
these particular, so-called today, "regulated" industries and not
others.
Several economic justifications are often offered for the need
for direct government regulation of certain industries [Kahn 1970]:
* The importance of these industries as measured
by their significant share of total national output
as well as by their great influence, as suppliers
of essential inputs and/or services to other
industries, on the size and rate of growth of the
total economy. These industries constitute a sub-
stantial segment of the infrastructure whose ex-
istence and smooth functioning is a fundamental
prerequisite for economic growth and development.
Furthermore, these industries are generally characterized
by economies of scale and are therefore quite dependent
for their profitability on the rate at which the
economy and consequently the demand for their
product (services) is expanding.
* Because of the above mentioned economies of
scale many of these industries are so-called
"natural monopolies" which will have lower costs
and operate more efficiently if they consist of
a single supplier. The existence of decreasing
marginal costs over a considerable range will
thus allow the firm to expand volume and, in
doing so, to diminish the elasticity of its
demand curve, and will require the intervention
of the government to protect the consuming public
from "monopolistic exploitation" [Robinson(1933)].
* For a number of different possible reasons,
competition does not work well in these industries.
In fact, the various motives that are given for the necessity
of imposing regulation on certain industries depend on the assumptions
that are made on the objectives that the government is pursuing when
establishing said regulation.
Several theories of economic regulation have been developed in
recent years, both by economists and political scientists, to ex-
plain the objectives and motives behind government regulation of some
industries. Three basic theories have been proposed: the public
interest theory; the capture theory and the economic theory.
2.2 THE PUBLIC INTEREST THEORY OF REGULATION
The public interest theory of economic regulation has been
widely used and quoted both by economists and lawyers in their
analysis of the government regulatory process. [See for example Bonbright
(1961), Davis (1972) and Friendly (1962)]. The theory states that
regulation of some industries is established in response to public
implicit or explicit demands for the correction of inefficient or
unfair market practices.
2.2.1 The Basic Assumptions
The theory of public interest is based on two main assumptions
which, in the particular case of the U.S., were the rationale behind
government regulation roughly from the time of the enactment of the
first Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 until the late 1950's. These
two assumptions are [Posner (1974)]:
* Competitive economic markets are under
some circumstances (such as high market
concentration, decreasing cost structures
and existence of positive or negative exter-
nalities) extremely fragile and apt to operate
quite inefficiently or inequitable if left alone.
* Government regulation is virtually costless.
Under these two assumptions, it is argued that the principal
government interventions in the economy are simply in response to
public demands for the rectification of easily recognizable and
corrigible inefficiencies and inequities in the competitive operation
of the free market. Behind each regulatory framework a market
imperfection can, according to this theory, be identified, the
existence of which provides the rationale for the imposition of
said regulations, provided that these are assumed to operate
effectively and in a costless way.
This theory has been used to justify the establishment of
regulations as diverse as trade union protection, public utility
and common carrier regulation, public power and reclamation pro-
grams, farm subsidies, minimum wages and even tariffs. [Posner (1974)].
In this study we will be mainly concerned with the arguments which
have been developed for the cases of public utility and common
carrier regulation which are the ones which can be applied to the
transport sector.
2.2.2 Defining the Public Interest
The public interest theory, as constructed in most treatises on
public utility economics, is a normative rather than a positive
theory. It is mainly concerned with the rationalization of regulation
on the basis of an implicit government obligation to serve the
"public interest"; in its acceptance of a norm or objective by which
to evaluate different decisions it is similar to other purposive
theories, but it is almost unique in the extreme vagueness of the
definition of its ultimate norm, the public interest, and in the
highly indirect and unprovable relationship between regulatory
changes and effects on social welfare.
In the particular case of public utility and common carrier
regulation though, the definition of the public interest and the
effects of regulatory changes on social welfare are easily identi-
fiable, at least on a theoretical basis, for virtually all the
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factors that have in the past generated public demand for the
regulation of these sectors. These factors can be basically classi-
fied in two categories: the presence of decreasing cost structures
leading in the long run to finite elasticity of demand and monopoly
pricing and the existence of externalities. The effects of monopoly
pricing and externalities on social welfare have been thoroughly
analyzed by economic theory and the rationale for regulation based
on public interest becomes therefore quite clear in these cases.
2.2.2.1 The Case of Monopoly Pricing
The existence of decreasing marginal (and average) cost
structures over a wide range of output levels in a given market
will induce production volume expansion as firms find it profitable
to drive others out of the market by price-cutting. In the long
run only the most efficient producer will remain and a monopoly
will have been established. (See Figure 2-1). Once a monopoly
been established, entry into the market will be difficult since any
new firm will have to produce at relatively low levels of output
where costs will be higher than the market price determined by the
monopolist's output*
The cost of monopoly pricing in terms of social welfare is
discussed in Appendix 1.
*It is important to emphasize that the range of decreasing costs has to be
large only relatively to the total volume of the market in question.
100 % OF TOTAL
MARKET VOLUME
FIGURE 2-1 COST STRUCTURE OF A NATURAL MONOPOLY
2.2.2.2 The Case of Externalities
Another case in which free competition can also fail to allocate
resources efficiently is the case where externalities, or inter-
actions among firms and individuals that are not adequately reflected
in market prices, are present. Examples of such occurrences are
numerous. One of the most commonly found is the case of a firm that
pollutes the environment with its industrial waste. Such an ex-
ternality will result in a positive divergence between the social
marginal cost and the private .marginal cost of its product. This
divergence will cause a misallocation of resources (with excess relative
production of its output) in a free market economy.
Under these circumstances, government regulation will be
needed to correct the misallocation of resources.
2.2.3 The Empirical Evidence
If the public interest theory were correct, we would find
regulation imposed primarily on highly concentrated industries or
industries where decreasing cost structures exist (where the
development of a monopoly is more likely) and on industries that
generate significant external costs or benefits (where failure of the
free market to achieve an efficient allocation of resources is more
likely. In fact, the evidence of theoretical and empirical research
on the matter conducted mainly by economists in the last twenty years
points to the fact that there is no such positive correlation between
the level of regulation and the monopolistic market structure or the
presence of external economies or diseconomies of scale. [Posner
(1974)].
Furthermore, the conception of government regulation as a
costless and dependably effective instrument for influencing and
directing the behavior of a'market has also been found to be inaccurate
[see, for example, Hirshleifer et al (1960), Posner (1969, 1970)]. This
revision of the theory has prompted numerous case studies of regulation
in particular industries in the U.S. such as natural gas production,
trucking, airlines and broadcasting; the results have shown that in
many industries regulation cannot be explained by the classic theory
of public interest and, furthermore, that regulation has not increased
either the wealth or the equity of the society by any widely accepted
standard [see, for example, Cabinet Task Force on Import Control (1970),
Hilton (1966), Jordan (1970, 1972)].
As a consequence of these findings, several reformulations of the
public interest theory of regulation have been developed.
2.2.4 A Reformulation of the Public Interest Theory; the Theory of
Public Mismanagement.
This reformulation of the theory of public interest attempts to
reconcile the theory with the evidence referred to above by arguing
that the disappointing performance of the regulatory process is not
caused by any unsoundness of its original objectives or its course of
action but, rather, by problems of mismanagement and/or procedure that
are a result of inexperience and that can and will be corrected, at
a low cost, as the concerned agencies become more familiar with the
mechanisms of public regulation. In its reformulation, therefore, the
public interest theory of regulation states that regulatory agencies
are created for the bona fide purposes described in 2.2.2 above;
these objectives are, nevertheless, not always achieved as a result
of mismanagement and lack of public administrative experience.
As pointed out by Posner (1974) this reformulation is quite
unsatisfactory on three grounds:
* First, it fails to take into consideration the
fact that many of the socially undesirable results
of regulation have been actively pursued by some
groups that have been influential in the enactment
and the defense of regulation on the particular
industry. Thus, in the U.S., for example, both the
trucking and airline industries sought the extension
of common carrier status to their sectors as a way
to neutralize what they considered excessive competition
under unregulated conditions. Furthermore, the ICC
regulatory statute was in itself contrary to
competition in these transport markets in a way hardly
explicable through any public interest criterion.
* Second, very little evidence has been provided to
prove the alleged mismanagement of the regulatory
agencies. On the other hand, there is considerable
evidence that appears to support the claim put forward
by the capture theory of regulation discussed in 2.3
below that regulatory agencies are, in general, operated
quite efficiently to attain simply inefficient or
inequitable objectives contained in the regulatory
statutes.
Very often regulatory agencies are criticized
for failing to engage in policy planning and
for relying, rather, on a case by case adjudication
to develop regulatory policies. In fact, the
agencies that have attempted any such planning
in the U.S. (the Federal Communications Commission
in particular) have met with disastrous failures
in policy design.
* Finally, there appears to be no reason as to why
regulatory agencies should, in particular, be
expected to be less efficient than other organizations.
The usual argument that lower salaries in government
regulatory agencies could explain the relative
inefficiency of its members ignores the fact that
service with a government agency enlarges the ex-
pected future stream of earnings of an individual
in the private sector (expansion of human capital
base), and the existence of many efficient public
bodies).
2.2.5 A Further Reformulation of the Public Interest Theory.
A further reformulation of the public interest theory has
been developed to attempt to show that while regulatory objectives
are concordant with the public interest, problems associated with
the implementation of regulations make them appear not to be. This
new formulation is based on two premises:
* Most of the tasks assigned to regulatory agencies
are, by their own nature, of an intractable
character. A good example is the regulation
of price levels charged by public utilities and
regulated carriers; in general, the agency is
required to determine the cost structure of the
concerned firm and to fix its prices so as to
link its profits to its capital base via a "fair"
rate of return. Since there is ground to believe
that the methodologies of measurement and control
necessary for this task simply do not exist, the
agency is clearly being asked to perform beyond its
limitations and it is therefore not surprising that it
should fail.
* The second premise is that the cost associated
with regulation rises rapidly with volume. As
pointed out by Ehrlich and Posner (1974), legis-
lative bodies are a type of operation in which the
costs of "production" are very high and, furthermore,
rise very fast with increases in output. This is
largely due to the fact that "legislative production"
consists of a number of bargains between numerous
and dissimilar groups; since the cost of bargaining
increases with the number of groups or individuals
involved, a legislative body cannot respond to a
growth in workload simply by enlarging its memberships.
As its business expands, a legislature has to rely
increasingly on its dependent agencies for the
completion of the work and must, therefore relinquish
part of its control over said agencies. This
"life cycle" hypothesis suggests that as regulatory
problems become more extended and complex control
of the regulatory process is further and further
diverted from the legislature which originally enacted
regulation to the agencies responsible for its en-
forcement; in this way a divergence between the
originally stated public interest objectives of the
legislative body and the goals actually achieved by
the agency may occur.
2.2.6 The Linkage Between the Public Interest Theory and the
Underlying Political Structure
As can be clearly identified in all three formulations of the
public interest theory, the regulatory process is singnificantly in-
fluenced by the underlying political structure of the country under
consideration. The political structure will provide the institutional
mechanisms by which the public perception as to what legislative
policies or procedures would maximize public welfare (public interest)
are translated into legislative action and later implemented (see
Figure 2-2). Thus, the same public perception of the common interest
would produce very different legislative result under a U.S. type
democratic political structure than under a Soviet style centralized
regime.
This fact will be of particular importance later, in 2.5 below,
when we turn to the specific analysis of regulation in developing
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countries. Here we will briefly discuss the regulatory implications
of two extreme political organizations: the democratic free market
state and the totalitarian centrally planned state; the effects of
the institutional setting on government regulation in these two
border cases will help us analyze other intermediate political
scenarios, particularly in less developed countries.
2.2.6.1 The Democratic State
In a democratic state the public perception of the common
interest is indirectly translated into legislative action and
implementation through the electoral process. In such a political
framework the problem arises that even if the individual can clearly
identify his personal perception of the public interest he might
not vote for it but, rather, against it if it should conflict
with his own perception of his personal interest. Thus, it does not
suffice to assume that the individual will vote for the candidate
who promises to implement the policies that the voter perceives
to be in the public interest, since policies which go against
the public interest might benefit the particular voter more. Faced
with this conflict between principle and interest it is not clear
what any individual's decision would be. If we assume that individuals'
perceptions of the public interest differ, the answer to the question
of how public perceptions are transformed into regulatory actions
in such a political structure is clearly not a simple one.
Two alternative hypothesis have been proposed to explain this
"transfer" process: the theory of principle and the theory of political
collusion.
* The theory of principle [Coase (1959)] argues
that there are "moral" differences between private
and political action. When faced with a political
decision (voting) in which his personal interest
and principles conflict, the individual will
(hopefully) opt for the choice which benefits
the public interest even if it implies a potential
detriment to his own personal welfare. If some
homogeneity of perceptions on basic public issues
exists, it is argued that a political consensus can
be reached. This theory is clearly based on very
strong behavioral assumptions whose validity is,
to say the least, questionable.
* The theory of political collusion [Posner (1974)]
argues that, given the high potentiality for
collusion among politicians that exists in a
democracy, there appear to be numerous opport-
unities for the politicians who dominate the
leading parties to impose some of their own
policy preferences on the electorate. In this
view, many policies are adopted and implemented
because they conform to the public interest -
as conceived by the politicians. To anybody
familiar with the workings of a democracy this
theory should not appear to be so implausible.
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Even though both theories are clearly different, they seem
to agree on one important issue; even in a democracy the view
of the public interest that is held by politicians and decision
makers is, at the very least, somewhat divorced from the public
interest as perceived by the electorate.
2.2.6.2 The Totalitarian State
The above conclusion is even more warranted in the case of
a totalitarian state where decision makers, free from the constraint
of having to please an electorate with their policies, are capable
of interpreting the public interest at will and to design and
implement policies accordingly, as long as they do not violate the
rules that control the internal balance of power of the government.
This is not to say that the policies so generated will serve the
public interest any worse than those developed in a democracy or that
they will less readily be supported by the general public. In fact,
political approval by an electorate is no guaranty of rational distin-
ction and, as for as generating public support for government policies
goes, a government controlled mass media system should be a much
better job than an uncensured one.
2.3 THE CAPTURE THEORY OF REGULATION
The capture theory contends that regulation of industry
is not at all imposed to defend the public interest but, rather,
that it is a process by which different interest groups seek
to promote their own private interests.
2.3.1 The Marxist Formulation
This formulation of the theory, which has been put forward by
Marxist economists and consumer advocates states simply that the
regulatory process is, in fact, controlled by big business which
utilizes it as a mean to further its own objectives vis-a-vis
those of the general public. It clearly fails to take into con-
sideration the numerous instances in which regulation serves the
interests of small business (or non-business) groups and even
labor (as is the case of trade unions)
2.3.2 The Classic Capture Theory of Regulation
A more useful version of the capture theory has been developed
by political scientists along the lines suggested by Bentley (1908)
and Truman (1951). This formulation states that over time regulatory
agencies came to be dominated ("captured") by the industries which
they are supposed to regulate. In this way, the objectives of the
regulatory agency are changed from the original goals set forward
by the legislature at the time of enacting regulation to the final
objectives which are more concordant with those of the regulated
industries.
Although this theory provides new insight into the relation-
ship between the regulated industries and the regulatory agency
that complements some of the concepts addressed by the public
interest theory, a number of unanswered questions remain. No reason
is given as to why the regulated industry should be the only
interest group to gain ascendancy over the regulatory agency;
customers (both individuals and firms) have an interest at stake
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in the regulation of the supplier firm and it is not clear why
they should not attempt to, and succeed in achieving control
over the agency. Furthermore, no reason is suggested as to why
industries that are strong enough to modify an agency's objectives
did not have the strength to avoid its creation in the first place.
In addition, there is considerable empirical evidence that
appears to contradict the theory. As mentioned earlier, a major
purpose of the original Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 in the
U.S. was to fortify the existing railroad cartels. Subsequent
amendments and measures by the Interstate Commerce Commission
have been less and not more favorable to the railroads. (The
Hepburn Act, for example, which gave the I.C.C. the power to
determine maximum rate). This sequence of events is clearly not
in accordance with the capture theory. The theory does not
further explain how the capture process works when a single agency
regulates several competing industries (as is the case with the I.C.
C.).
2.4 THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF REGULATION
The economic theory of regulation was first proposed by Stigler
(1971) in an article that builds on the earlier work of Buchanan and
Tullock (1962), Downs (1957), and Olson (1965) on the political system.
The theory is, in certain aspects, similar to,but more refined than,
the capture theory of regulation; it de-emphasizes the role of the
public interest in motivating regulatory legislation, it admits
the possibility of capture of the regulatory agency by the regulated
industry as well as by other interest groups, and it coincides
with the capture theory in recognizing that regulation will usually
serve the private interests of politically powerful groups.
The theory is based on two basic principles:
* The coercive power of government can be applied
to give valuable benefits to particular individuals
or interest groups through the application of
regulation in the economic environment. The
allocation of said regulation within each market
or group of markets is governed by the laws of
supply and demand.
* The theory of cartels might provide some
information as to the supply of and demand for
regulation in a particular market.
2.4.1 The Theory of Cartels and its Relation to the Economic
Theory of Regulation
If regulation is assumed to be allocated in response to the
laws of supply and demand, then it is important to evaluate what
the benefits of regulation will be for different individuals, since,
ceteris paribus, we should expect regulation to be supplied to
those who value it the most. Furthermore, the factors affecting the
cost of regulation should also be analyzed since they will be import-
ant determinants of its supply.
The theory of cartels provides valuable insight into both
the benefit and the cost aspects of regulation. This theory states
that the value of cartelization in an industry is inversely related
to the elasticity of demand for the industry's product and directly
related to the cost of or the impedance to new entry into the
industry or into the cartelized markets within the industry.
The two major costs (leaving aside punishment or legal defense
costs in countries where cartelization is illegal under anti-
trust laws) are (i) the costs to the suppliers of arriving at an
agreement on the price to be charged for the product and on the
relative output shares of the cartel members that will set the
individual members' profits and (ii) the cost of enforcing the
cartel agreement by punishing non-participants or price-undercutters
inside the cartel. This second cost is particularly significant
since the problem of "free riders" is common in all cartel agree-
ments and is probably the most frequent factor behind the dissolution
of many such understandings.
After an agreement has been reached on price and market shares,
any supplier will benefit from selling at a slightly lower-than-
the-agreed price and expanding his volume share at the expense
of the other members. If several members fail to stick to their
commitment, a price war will ensue and the cartel will collapse.
Thus, a cartel will be particularly vulnerable if its members
are, at least in the short run, able to conceal price cuts from
one another since then every member will have a strong inclination
to attempt to recoup some short-term profits from other members.
Given that the effect of market regulation in the form
discussed above (entry and exit control, price and rate of return
regulation, and exemption from antitrust laws) is identical to that
cartelization - to raise prices above competitive levels - the
benefit aspects of the theory of cartels is clearly relevant to
the analysis of regulation. The cost sides of cartelization
also appear to be closely related. The firms in the industry will
have a saying in the design of regulation and will have to agree
to some specific form of it. Furthermore, the individual firm's
profits will be maximized, as in the case of cartelization, by
avoiding regulation, as long as all other firms in the industry
are regulated. Thus, a firm will always have an incentive to avoid
becoming regulated; if he is regulated after all he will nevertheless
benefit from it since he cannot be excluded from the protection
of an overall regulation.
In conclusion, many findings of the theory of cartels can be
successfully applied to the analysis of government regulation of
industry [Posner (1971)].
* As is the case with cartelization, the fewer
the prospective beneficiaries of a regulation,
the easier it will be for them to coordinate
their efforts to obtain such regulation. It
will also be harder for any one individual
firm to refuse to participate in the procurement
effort without causing it to collapse.
* The homogeneity of the interests of the
affected firms will also have a positive effect
on the advent of regulation since it will make
it easier for them to reach a consensus which is
not detrimental to any one member in particular.
Even though the theory of cartels is relevant to the
theory of regulation there are still important differences
between the two. If this would not be so, we would observe the
same industries forming stable cartels and obtaining government
regulation as is clearly not the case. Many industries such as
agriculture, textiles and some branches of retail trade,which
clearly have not characteristics that are favorable for cartelization,
have obtained supportive government regulation in the U.S. Actually,
it has been observed that highly concentrated industries are
less likely to obtain favorable regulation than less concentrated
industries, contrary to the expectation of the theory of cartelization
[see, for example, MacPherson (1972)].
This evidence points out to specific differences that exist
between the theory of cartels and the economic theory of regulation,
both on the demand and supply side of regulation.
2.4.2 Differences Between the Economic Theory of Regulation and
the Theory of Cartels in Relation to the Demand for Regulation
The demand for regulation, which is derived from its
potential contribution to raise the profits of the regulated industries,
is greater within industries for which cartelization is either not
feasible or, if feasible, very costly. These industries lack an
implementable substitute for regulation for a number of reasons
such as low market concentration, diversity of interests, physical
dispersion, etc. As a result the pattern of demand for private
cartelization and the pattern of demand for regulation will, in
general, differ.
2.4.3 Differences Between the Economic Theory of Regulation and
the Theory of Cartels in Relation to the Supply of
Regulation
While cartelization requires solely the cooperation of the
affected firms in reaching a consensus (provided that cartelization
is not prohibited by anti-trust laws or that, if it is, the agree-
ment is kept secret), favorable regulation will be implemented only
if, in addition, the positive intervention of the political system
is secured. Some industries may be capable of obtaining the necessary
political support easier than others and they will not by force be
the same industries which can establish cartelization at a low cost.
Thus, in addition, the patterns of supply for both theories will
differ.
As pointed out by Stigler (1971) the effects of a large number
of members on the successful obtainment of cartelization and regulation
as a result of the existence of intra-industry asymmetry. Cartel-
ization will have a quite homogeneous effect on different individual
firms; regulation, on the other hand, can take numerous forms
(entry and/or exit control, price regulation, taxes and/or
subsidies, etc.) and may therefore have varied effects on distinct
firms. Thus, assuming a certain degree of asymmetry between the
different suppliers of the industry, we can conclude that they
will all be interested in participating in the industry campaign
for regulation in order to attempt to secure that the form of
regulation chosen is the most favorable to their situation. There-
fore, the free rider problem could be easily overcome in the case
of regulation, even if there are a large number of firms in an
industry, if sufficient assymetry exists among them. In this
case it would be cheaper for these firms to obtain protective
regulation than to cartelize.
Furthermore, the determinants of political leverage have
to be introduced into the analysis of the supply side of regulation.
In order to do so we have to specify the character of the political
environment with which the problem is being considered (compare
with 2.2.6 above) Posner (1974) considers three alternative
political scenarios:
* The enterpreneurial system where favorable
regulation is "sold" to the industries that
value it most and that can therefore bid
the highest price for it. As was mentioned before,
these would be the same industries that have highest
cartel benefits. The costs of cooperative action
do not need to be considered in this case since the
government can use its coercion powers to eliminate
any intra-industry "free rider" problems, so that
the industry can raise the maximum price for the
regulatory legislation.
* The coercive system in which regulation is
awarded to the groups that are able to generate
the most power of coercion and apply it on the
government in the form of public opinion pressure,
strikes or street violence. In the context of
this scenario it appears that the relative size of
the demanding group might have a significant
influence on the outcome of the awarding process.
* The democratic system where regulatory
legislation is awarded by elected representatives of
the people. As in the coercive system the ability
of the demanding group to muster political support,
be it in terms of number of voters or amount of
political campaign contributions, will be decisive
in fluencing the awarding procedure. In both the
coercive and the democratic systems, the "free
rider" problem remains unsolved since the existence
of free riders will clearly limit the capacity
of the demanding group to apply pressure on the
government. Note that the demanding group may
be the same or different from the group on which
regulation is sought to be imposed upon.
As this analysis shows, while that characteristics that
predispose an industry to seek cartelization successfully may
also help it obtain supportive government regulation, there is
a factor which discourages cartelization - a large number of
parties whose consensus is needed to establish and maintain the
cartel - that will encourage the generation of demand for
regulation (due to the difficulty of implementing cartelization
as a viable alternative and to an increased probability of the
existence of assymetries as well as the supply of regulation
(since large numbers have significant voting and coercive power
at their disposal)
3.0 THE EFFECT OF REGULATION ON TRANSPORT INVESTMENT
IN LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
3.1 A THEORY OF TRANSPORT REGULATION FOR LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
3.1.1 The Motives for Transportation Regulation in Developing Countries.
Given the close relationship that exists between the mobility of
nations and their level of economic growth and the general acceptance
of the fact that transportation investment is a necessary, albeit not
sufficient, condition for economic development, developing countries
have characteristically invested heavily in transport facilities as
part of an effort to stimulate their own growth, Thus, while developed
countries usually allocate 10 to 15 percent of their social investment
to transportation, less developed countries commonly destine 20 to 40
percent of their national budgets to capital investments in the different
transport modes.
In view of the importance of the transportation sector as a
recipient of public investment funds, it is not surprising to find
that governments in developing countries have been particularly con-
cerned with exercising some degree of control over said sector.
Four basic rationales for the need of government control of the
transport sector in less developed countries can be identified.
* Given the magnitude of transport investment
relative to total capital investment outlays and
the important role that transportation plays in
the development of both industry and agriculture,
it is necessary for the government to be able to
control the transport sector to a certain extent,
if it is to effectively manage the country's
economy.
* Since transportation activities are, as discussed in
Appendix 6, often characterized by decreasing marginal
(and average) cost structures and economies of
scale, the government is forced to intervene, through
regulation, to defend the "public interest" in the
cases where existing or potential private or public
autonomous natural monopolies threaten the efficient
and equitable operation of free markets.
* In some cases, existing powerful interest groups
which are either involved in the provision of,
or affected by, transport services manage to obtain
supportive or protective regulation from the government.
* Finally, considerations of efficient operation,
design and safety are generally behind the imposition
of operating regulations on the transport sector.
Furthermore, since in many developing countries the private very
often lacks the necessary capital to enter into the provision of trans-
port services, the government has, either directly or through public
corporations, considerable control over the transportation sector.
In general, both the relative weights of the motives for transport
regulations as well as the particular way in which these regulations
are imposed considerably depend on the socio-economic and political
environment in which these decisions are made. As pointed out by
Friedlander et al (1977), transportation regulatory policy often
attempts to satisfy a broad range of social and economic objec-
tives which in themselves may not be entirely consistent; the
design and implementation of said policy will therefore be the result
of implicit or explicit trade-offs among the various objectives which
will in their turn respond to the constraints of the established
political scenario.
In the context of developing countries the following socio-
economic objectives of transport regulatory policy can be enumerated:
• To exercise government control over an
important sector of the economy
• To secure adequate transport infrastructure
and service that will support the development
of backward regions and rural agricultural areas
• To provide a stable transportation rate environment
within which an orderly industrial development process
can take place.
• To protect users and the public in general from
inefficient or inequitable pricing and service
practices of monopolistic transportation firms.
• To protect transportation firms from the effects
of disruptive price competition and to secure,
in this way, the provision of transport services
required for socio-economic development.
• To ensure that the operation of transportation
modes is consistent with standards of design of
the infrastructure and with pre-established norms
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CHAPTER III
TRANSPORTATION COST FUNCTIONS
Introduction: the two basic approaches.
A literature review showed that there are two main approaches to
transportation cost functions from the operator's point of view:
i. an econometric approach, based on economic theory, whic,h can
be summarized this way. The transportation system is characterized by
a c~st minimization behavior, given a level of production, represented
by a production function. The solution of a mathematical program provides
. a cost function, either short-term, where capital is considered as fixed
or long term when it is an optimization variable. The functional result
is then estimated through econo~etric methods.
ii. an engineering approach, which focuses on technical operations.
Then deriving unit costs and assuming that they are constant in a eela-
'.tively small range of technology options and levels of output,·this
approach allows to calculate estimates of costs in various conditions of
investment, organization, regulation and technology.
The following section will be a literature review related to these
two approaches and through it, a description of their main features.
N.B.: a particular focus will on railroads as regards specific
examples.
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I. Economic theory and econometric approach.
Relationship between production function and cost function.
The basic assumption involved in the theory of production and cost
is that fimms are cost-minimizers at a given level of output. Therefore
the basic theoretical framework is the solution of a mathematical program
of the following form:
Minimize
s.t. r>'({lX.} ·,{Y.} ) = 0
1 i J j
....
where: Xi = outputs
y. = inputs
J
P{ {Xi} :,{Yj }) = production function
1 J
Wj = cost of input j
C = ~ YjWj = cost of inputs
J
Duality theory implies that the long-run cost function describes a
well-behaved technology as well as a production function, provided certain
mathematical properties. Therefore, in theory, provided that cost-
minimization holds, the mere data of short-run cost functions at various
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levels of capital allow to deduce the long-run cost function, as their
envelope, and consequently the structure of technology.
Then within this framewdrk, if the purpose is to derive cost-func-
tions, either short-term or.long-term, we need:
- a functional expression of the production function
- prices of inputs.
Reversely, cost-functions allow to go back to the structure of technology.
Now the validity of econometric estimates derived from the frame-
work described above is highly questionable. According to Ann
Friedlaender there are three major reasons to this phenomenon: (13),
1. The output of transportation firms is multidimensional. Trans-
portation services have very different characteristics within
the same firm: different users, origins, destinations, quality
of service. The mix of outputs can have a major impact upon
costs of any given firm. Consequently, an aggregate measure
of output is not adequate. The quality of services must be
incorporated. There is a tradeoff at this point between data
requirements and theoretical relevance.
2. Because of joint and common costs, transportation industry is
characterized by joint production. Therefore a separable Clobb
Douglas production function, which is the most widely used in
the literature is not necessarily a good representation of reality.
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Table 3-1
Truck Fleet by Load Capacity
Truck Size
(Tons Load
Capacity)
Registered Fleet
(% of fleet)
Under 3
3-5
5-10
10-15
15-20
20-25
25-30
Over 30
TOTAL
Rolling Fleet
(% of trips)
12.5
25.1
40.8
6.5
2.1
11.5
13.4
45.0
12.0
5.7
5.4
5.3
1.7
100.0
13.0
100.0
Source: Berger (1977)
truck fleet load capacity distributions by relative numbers and
relative share of total trips are shown in Table 3-1.
No reliable data exists as to the age distribution of the
vehicle fleet, although it is clear that many trucks are more than
20 years old. This has been caused by limited local production and
heavy import restrictions coupled with a large demand for vehicles,
which have determined low scrapping rates and a generalized
obsolescence of the fleet. This on the other hand has resulted in
high operating and maintenance cost and unreliability of service
caused by frequent break-downs.
Table 3-2 summarizes data on the type of trucks for general and
specialized transport provided by the Ministry of Transport for 1973/
1974. There is a high percentage of general purpose trucks (open,
closed and flat vehicles) comprising an 80 percent of the total fleet.
The low percentage of dump cars in the view of the large volume of
bulk carried by road seems to suggest that most of the loading and
unloading of bulk commodities is largely done manually.
The estimated freight traffic by mode for 1975 and forecasts for
1980 and 1985 are shown in Table 3-3.
The predominant types of commodities carried by each mode of
transport are shown in Table 3-4. The following is a review of some
of the individual commodity groups. [Berger (1977)].
1. Corn, Wheat, Maize
Of this commodity group, 85 percent of the tonnage is transported
on highways. For the Cairo-Alexandria movements, highways account
for 67 percent, railways 25 percent and inland waterways 8 percent.
Table 3-2
Truck Fleet by Type, 1973/74
Truck Type Percent of Trucks
Open 59.2
Closed 13.9
Flatbed 6.4
Dump 5.3
Refrigerated 0.2
Special 9.3
Tank 5.7
Total 100.0
Source: Berger (1977)
Table 3-3
TRANSPORT VOLUMES AND TON-KM BY MODE
(000) Million
Tons Ton-Km
1975
Railways' 7,803 2,190
Highways 2  58,278 12,206
Waterways3  4,248 1,888
Total 70,329 16,284
1980
Railways 10,300 2,781
Highways 80,704 16,348
Waterways 6,356 2,336
Total 97,360 21,465
1985
Railways 22,900 7,900
Highways 94,056 16,842
Waterways 18,105 5,661
Total 135,061 30,403
1 Excludes railways' own - account freight
2 Includes only interzonal traffic; figures shown are from Consultants' 1976 O-D Survey,
reduced by 8%.
Estimated minimum.
Note: The highway and waterway statistics for 1975 are broad estimates. Exclusion of intrazonal
and local traffic from the highway statistics and the error inherent in a single brief O-D Survey
make the drawing of other than general conclusions about modal split on the basis of the table
inadvisable.
Source: Berger (1977)
_~ _ 
__
The only other significant corridor where more than one mode is involved
is the Cairo-Aswan corridor, where waterways carried more than high-
ways in 1976. It is expected that the share of highways in the Cairo-
Alexandria flows will decrease to 50 percent by 1980 and to 13 percent
by 1985. For the entire network, the modal splits are expected to be
77 percent, 15 percent, and 8 percent for highways, railways and
waterways respectively by 1980 and 57 percent, 20 percent and 23 percent
by 1985. The present splits are 83 percent, 12 percent and 5 percent.
2. Cotton
Only one percent moved on railways and none on inland waterways
in 1976. In the future, highways are expected to be the only mode
to transport this commodity.
3. Farm Products
The present modal splits are 95 percent, 2 percent and 3 percent
for highways, railways and waterways respectively. These are not
expected to change significantly by 1980 but should be 86 percent,
6 percent and 8 percent by 1985. Little intermodal competition exists
outside of the Alexandria-Cairo-Aswan corridor.
4. Livestock
Only highways are involved and this is expected to remain the
case.
5. Ores (Including Phosphate)
In this group, 28 percent were moved on highways in 1976 with the
highway movements being mainly short haul. The share of highways
is expected to decline to 20 by 1980 and 3 percent by 1985.
IRailways'
Commodity
Non-perishabel foods
Corn and Wheat
Sand, gravel, clay, limestone
Other petroleum products
Perishable foods
Total
Table 3-4
TYPE OF COMMODITY TRANSPORTED
(% of total tonnage)
% of
Total
42.9
12.0
9.7
6.0
5.2
75.8
Inland Waterways2
Commodity
Raw and processed fertilizer;
mineral and non-mineral ores
Refined petroleum and
and products
Sugar, sugar products,
molasses
Sand, gravel, clay, stones
Coal, coke
Total
% of
Total
24.0
16.7
14.8
11.0
8.7
75.2
Highways'
Commodity
Farm products (excluding cotton
and cereals)
Construction materials
Manufactured goods
Sand, gravel, clay, limestone
Corn, wheat, maize
Total
1 February, 1975 data
2 1975 reports of two Organization Companies and lock registration of April, 1976 for Sugar Company, private barge and sailing boats.
3 1976 O-D survey.
Source: Berger (1977)
% of
Total
31.8
16.3
14,3
14.2
7.2
83.8
6. Coal, Coke
The share of highways is insignificant and is expected to remain
SO.
7. Sand, Gravel, Clay and Limestone
The share of highways is very large (94 percent) probably due
to the short transport distances involved and the extra loading and
unloading involved in railways and waterways. Over 50 percent is
transported on highways, even for the relatively long hauls in the
Cairo-Alexandria corridor.
8. Steel
Movements on railways account for 7 percent of the total in 1976 and
are expected to reach 18 percent by 1980 and 27 percent by 1985. Water-
ways are not involved. The bulk of the Cairo-Alexandria flows, which
account for 70 percent of the total, are transported on highways with
a share of 96 percent.
9. Construction Materials
This category consists mainly of cement and 98 percent is trans-
ported on highways, with the only significant intermodal competition
being in the Cairo-Aswan corridor where railways and waterways trans-
ported 25 percent of the movements. The share of highways is expected
to decline to 94 percent by 1980 and 82 percent by 1985 with the bulk
of the remainder being on waterways.
10. Manufactured Fertilizers
The 91 percent share of highways is expected to decline to 87
percent by 1980 and 80 percent by 1985. The only significant
intermodal competition should be in the Alexandria-Cairo-Aswan
corridor. The share of railways is expected to increase from 6 per-
cent in 1976 to 10 percent by 1980 and 7 percent by 1985, while that
of waterways should remain at 3 percent to 1980 and increase to 13
percent by 1985.
11. Manufactured Goods
Highways carried 98 percent in 1976. This is expected to decrease
to 87 percent by 1985 with the bulk of the remainder to be handled by
railways.
As noted previously, the most outstanding feature of the traffic
allocation is the predominance of highways, even for relatively low-
value goods suitable for bulk handling, such as cereals, sand, gravel,
cement and fertilizer. Since the analysis considers only inter-zonal
movements, it is unlikely that any significant proportion of this
highway transport represents movements to and from the railway and
waterways. This tends to be confirmed by the average lengths of haul
for freight: 282 km by highway. It is apparent that freight which
would normally be attracted to the other modes is moving on the high-
ways, even though it should be possible to carry it at lower cost on
the other modes given adequate capacity and reasonably efficient
operation.
Passenger traffic appears to be more evenly distributed between
road and rail, which is as expected as the railway has concentrated
on maintaining its passenger service and has allocated motive power
accordingly.
In conclusion then, the highways in Egypt are carrying a
large amount of freight traffic which could be carried at lower
costs by the railway given efficient operation. The allocation
of freight traffic among the three major modes is trongly influenced
at present by capacity constraints on the railway and the inland
waterways. The freight capacity of the railway has declined in recent
years, primarily because of inadequate serviceability of rolling stock,
and the railway's freight traffic has diminished at the same time that
total freight traffic was increasing. The railway is further penalized
by inadequate access to the Port of Alexandria. The main result of
these circumstances is that much of the traffic which would normally
travel by rail and inland waterways, if cost and service characteristics
were the ruling factors, instead travels by highway. This is made
possible by the facts that the highways themselves generally have excess
capacity and the vehicle fleet can be expanded (or its utilization
increased) relatively rapidly. Thus, the available excess highway
capacity permits the capacity constraints on the railway and inland
waterways to exist without dramatic consequences in the form of obvious
and severe transport bottlenecks. However, this results in a higher-
than-necessary cost of transport in the short run. In the long run,
especially with the expected increase in transport demand for bulk
commodities such as wheat and phosphates, it will not be possible to
maintain a reasonable level of transport costs and service without
additional capacity in these modes. It is unlikely that measures
to restore and/or increase capacity will have a significant effect
prior to 1980, and this is reflected in the forecasts made in this
report. However, by 1985, significant growth in the traffic carried
by these modes is expected.
3.3 THE EFFECTS OF MARKET REGULATION ON TRANSPORT INVESTMENT IN DEVFLCPING
COUNTRIFS
Both market and operating regulations affect the level, timing
and distribution of investment in transportation. Market
regulations usually have more significant effects on investment than
operating regulations in the short run since they determine the
structure of the market in which the firm operates, the amount of com-
petition that it faces and the rate of return on any imputed capital.
In the long run though, the effects of operating regulations will
become much more substantial as the constraints they impose on the
relevant firms will reshape old markets and create new ones.
The effects of market regulation on investment can be classified
into two categories:
* Changes in the structure of the capital market
that the firm uses as a source of financial
resources for capital investment.
* Changes in the management and operation of the
firm that will affect the level and time and
space allocation of its investment outlays.
The first category of changes is related to the theory of capital
markets; the magnitude of such changes will depend on the relative im-
portance of private versus public funds as sources of capital for trans-
portation investment programs. The analysis of the effects of risk
reduction on the availability and cost of investment funds is based on
the mean variance formulation of the classic economic theory of
portfolio selection [Fama (1968) a,b), Long (1972), Markowitz (1959),
Mosin (1966), Sharpe (1964)]. This theory states that the capital
market places a positive price on risk-bearing in the form of higher rates
of return, where the risk is defined in relation to the investor's
total portfolio.
In this chapter we will be mainly concerned with the analysis of how
market regulations affect (i) the output, capacity and operating efficiency
of transport firms and (ii) the investment on new transportation tech-
nology, and of how particular operating regulations can affect investment
in both capacity and new technology in the sector. With respect to the
application of our results we will mainly concentrate on the issue of
railroad truck competition which is the case which is more relevant to
the Egyptian Transport situation, as discussed in 3.2 above.
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3.3.1 The Averch-Johnson Hypothesis [Averch and Johnson (1962)]
The Averch-Johnson hypothesis of rate of return regulation
attempts to develop a theory of the monopoly firm seeking to maximize
profit subject to a government regulatory constraint on its rate of
return. Two cases are analyzed; the first in which the monopoly
firm is restricted to produce in a single market, and the second
where the firm, in addition to operating in a single market, can also
enter other regulated markets and where the regulatory agency bases its
calculations of the "fair" rate of return on the firm's overall value of
plant and equipment for all markets rather than computing a separate
rate of return for each market. A mathematical derivation of the theory
is given in Appendix 2.
3.3.1.1 Conclusions of the Averch-Johnson Hypothesis
The conclusions of the Averch-Johnson theory of rate of return
regulation can be summarized as follows:
* In the single market case
If the rate of return permitted by the regulatory
agency is greater than the market or shadow cost of
capital but is less than the rate of return that the
monopoly firm would get were it free to maximize
profits without the regulatory constraint, then the
firm will substitute capital for the other factor of
production (labor) to a point where the marginal
rate of factor substitution is not equal to the
ratio of factor costs and will therefore operate
inefficiently in the sense that capital over-
capacity exists and (social) cost is not minimized
at the chosen output level.
* In the multiple market case
If in addition to operating in a single market,
the firm can also enter into other regulated
markets and the regulatory agency bases its
estimation of the "fair" rate of return on the
firm's overall assets rather than computing a
separate rate of return for each market, then
the firm will have an incentive, which it would
not have in the absence of regulation, to enter
into these other markets, even if the cost of
doing so exceeds the additional revenues.
By expanding into other markets the firm will be
able to enlarge its rate base to satisfy the reg-
ulatory constraint and earn a greater total profit
than would have been allowed in the absence of other
markets. As a result, the expanding firm may have
an advantage over competitors in oligopolistic or
competitive second markets since it will be able
to take long run losses in these markets that competing
firms cannot. It could, therefore, conceivably
drive lower cost producers out of the secondary
markets or discourage their entry into it if the
loss it can take exceeds the differential between
its costs and the lower costs of the more
efficient firms. It should be noted that unlike
the case of predatory discount pricing where the
monopolist may cut prices at a loss,temporarily,
to drive out competitors in the expectation of making
positive long term economic profits, the regulated
monopolist will undercut its competitors in the
secondary markets, even at a long run loss, as long
as it can derive additional overall profits from
including its capital input in these markets in
its rate base.
3.3.1.2 The Empirical Evidence
Considerable empirical evidence supporting the Averch-
Johnson hypothesis in different regulated industries has been
provided in recent years [Averch and Johnson (1962), Courville
(1974), Spann (n.d., 1974), Westfield (1965)].
The U.S. Telephone and Telegraph Industry [Averch and Johnson (1962)]
This study attempts to find empirical evidence of the Averch-
Johnson hypotheses stated above in the U.S. telephone and telegraph
industry which has a market structure and a regulatory setting
consistent with those assumed by the theory. Basically, the
industry's market structure is characterized by varying degrees of
competition from one subsector to another. Bell Telephone System,
a subsidiary of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company,
through its 22 associated regional subsidiaries, and other common
carriers have monopoly positions in the provision of public
message telephone and telegraph services, while they compete with
each other in supplying private line services to customers who are,
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in addition, free to construct private wire facilities for their
own use as an alternative to buying the service from the common
carriers. Both state regulatory commissions (which regulate intra-
state services of common carriers) and the Federal Communications
Commission (which regulates interstate operations) use a "fair"
rate of return criterion in regulating prices within their respective
jurisdictions.
While no clear cut empirical evidence is available that supports
the hypothesis that the common carriers in the industry overinvest
in plant and equipment capacity, there is considerable evidence
at hand that supports the contention of expansionary "dumping" of
services in secondary markets. In particular, fears of "unfair"
competition based on operations at "noncompensatory" prices in
private line markets play a prominent role as a source of conflict
among the common carriers and between them and the F.C.C. Furthermore,
in establishing a commercial communications satellite system, the U.S.
federal government has enacted a law containing provisions that
apparently exploit, "in the public interest,"the willingness of
common carriers to operate at a loss in secondary markets.
Overcapitalization in the U.S. Electric Utility Industry [Spann(1974)]
This study attempts to show the overcapitalization hypothesis,
argued by Averch and Johnson, for the case of the regulated U.S.
electric utility sector. It assumes a transcendental-logarithmic
production function for electric utilities with three factor inputs
(capital, labor and fuel) and proves that with such a production
function the Averch-Johnson Hypothesis implies a specific set of
constraints on the factor share equations. [See Appendix 3 for
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mathematical formulation]. These constraints are then used to
test the validity of the Averch-Johnson thesis.
The Averch-Johnson theory of overcapitalization in industries
under rate of return regulation was accepted in almost all cases
for the electric utility sector.
3.3.1.3 Implications of the Averch-Jdhnson Theory for Transport
Investment in Less Developed Countries
The Averch-Johnson thesis has important implications for transport
investment in developing countries. There are basically two trans-
portation modes that fulfill the hypotheses of the Averch-Johnson
theory: railroads and trucking. Both can be assumed to produce, to
a considerable extent, a homogeneous product; both are natural mono-
polies characterized by decreasing cost structures; and both are
generally subjected to market regulation.
First we will attempt to show that, in the particular case of
less developed countries, the Averch-Johnson thesis cannot be applied
to the railroads, but that it is, on the other hand, applicable to the
trucking sector. Next we will analyze what the implications of the
theory are for transportation in general and for rail truck competition
in the context of developing countries.
The railroads are usually operated by the government in LDC's
either directly or through public "independent" corporations. As
pointed out by Due (1979), they have been characterized, in most cases,
by heavy losses as a result of some combination of the following
factors:
* Rates have been purposely held down by the
government as a way to achieve developmental,
export expansion, or inflation control objectives.
* Operations are inefficient due to poor
management, inadequate equipment and lack of
spare parts.
e Railroads have lost increasing amounts of volume
to the trucking sector.
* Operations are overstaffed as a result of government
employment generation objectives and strong labor
unions.
As a consequence of these factors railroad operations in less
developed countries have generally experienced losses, at least
sporadically and, very often, consistently. We can, therefore,
conclude that, even if some internal rate of return regulation
exists for public railroad corporations, the regulated rate is likely
to be considerably lower than the market cost of capital, particularly
since the government is the only source of capital. Thus, a funda-
mental hypothesis of the Averch-Johnson theory is violated. Further-
more, given the general stagnation of new rail rights-of-way con-
struction that exists in most LDCs we can hardly consider the railroads
as capable of aggressively expanding into new markets.
In conclusion, in view of the relatively low and even negative
low predominant rates of return on capital for the sector and its
inability to expand rapidly into new markets, given the rigidity
of its infrastructure, the railroad sector in less developed countries
does clearly not fulfill the hypotheses of the Averch-Johnson theory.
The trucking sector in LDCs, on the other hand, falls within
the assumptions of the theory. Most developing countries have a
significant private trucking sector supported by private capital
subjected to market regulation and capable, if they find it profitable,
to expand into new markets. In the light of the fact that this
sector draws investment resources from private capital markets, it
is reasonable to conclude that, in equilibrium, the allowed rate of
return has to exceed the private cost of capital, that is, sl > r I.
Based on the Averch-Johnson theory, the following conclusions
can be made in relation to private regulated trucking in less
developed countries.
Overcapitalization in the Private Regulated Trucking Sector
If a private trucking firm is subjected to rate of return
regulation and is restricted to operate in a certain fixed number of
markets and if it is assumed that the permitted rate of return is
greater than the private cost of capital and less than the uncon-
strained rate of return, and that the firm is a profit maximizer,
then we can conclude that the firm will substitute capital for the
other factor of production, so that marginal rates of factor sub-
stitution are different from factor cost ratios. Rate of return
regulation under these conditions have the effect of making capital
less expensive relative to other inputs (such as labor).
The net result of this undervaluation of capital is that it
will be overutilized at the detriment of other factor inputs. In
the context of less developed countries this will have the following
three connotations:
* As shown in Figure 3-1, at the chosen regulated
output there will be a divergence 0 between the
"private" factor cost ratio to the firm and
the marginal rate of factor substitution in
production. Thus, as a result of rate of return
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FIGURE 3-1 THE AVERCH-JOHNSON THESIS; SINGLE MARKET CASE.
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regulation the trucking firm will be choosing
a socially inefficient combination of
inputs, since at the socially optimum input
combination it has to be true that the marginal
rate of factor substitution in production is
equal to the factor cost ratio.
* Given this non-zero divergence we have that
the output Q which is currently being produced
by the trucking firm with capital input K1
and labor input L1 could be produced more
efficiently (0 = 0) if regulation were
removed with factor inputs K2 and L2 respectively,
where K2 < K1 and L2 > L1. This is particularly
relevant for developing countries where capital
is, in general, in very scarce supply and has
a high opportunity cost, and where there are,
usually, ample supplies of labor.
* The negative effects of the overutilization of
capital described above are not restricted
to problems arising from the high opportunity
cost of capital in LDC but includes also
balance of payments considerations since most
of the capital equipment utilized by trucking
firms has to be imported. Therefore, over-
capitalization of trucking firms will result
also in overexpenditure of foreign exchange.
Expansion of Private Regulated Trucking Firm into Secondary Markets
If the private trucking firm is subjected to rate of return
regulation under the assumptions given above and, in addition, it
is allowed to expand into new markets so that the regulatory agency
bases its "fair rate of return" criterion on the firm's over-all
value of capital equipment rather than computing a separate rate of
return for each market, then the firm will have an incentive to
expand into secondary markets (which it would not have in the
absence of regulation) in order to enlarge its rate base even if it
has to incur a long run loss in these markets. Under these circum-
stances, it is conceivable that the firm could drive out lower cost
producers in the secondary if the loss that it would be willing to
take exceeds the cost advantage of more efficient producer.
Naturally, the trucking firm can expand into markets
where other trucking firms operate; the case on which we will con-
centrate though, since it is in our opinion the most relevant to
transportation investment in developing countries, is the one in
which the regulated trucking firm will expand into markets pre-
viously dominated by the railroads.
As pointed out by Friedlander (1979), the railroad industry
is relatively homogeneous in the sense that railroads usually
carry all kinds of traffic and face relatively similar markets.
The trucking industry, on the other hand, is quite segmented and
different types of trucking firms face quite different markets.
In this context, the most important difference probably lies
between the general commodity and the specialized commodity carriers.
General commodity carriers are characterized by a con-
siderable proportion of less-than-truckload (LTL) shipments, small
loads, and a large cost component of terminal and consolidation
operations. Carriers of specialized commodities, on the other
hand, have a significant proportion of truck-load (TL) shipments,
large loads and little terminal or consolidation activities.
Given the operating characteristics of railroads, trucking
firms clearly have a comparative advantage in the transportation
of small shipments of general commodities in LTL lots. There is,
therefore, little long run potential competition between railroads
and LTL general commodity trucking firms. Thus, even though in
many developing countries the railroads continue to provide less-
than-carload transport service for general commodities, it is ob-
viously an area where truck have a cost advantage and where they
do not need to operate at a loss to capture an increasing market
share from the railroads.
Consequently, the main area for future competition between
railroads and trucking firms is in the transport of specialized
bulk commodities, where railroads traditionally have had a com-
parative cost advantage and where the trucking firms ability to
operate at a long-run loss may allow them to expand into new markets
at the expense of the more cost efficient railroads.
When analyzing the effects of the Averch-Johnson rate of return
regulatory theory on rail-truck competition, in developing countries,
two basic conclusions can be drawn:
* The incentive to regulated trucking firms to
expand into secondary markets will accentuate
the growth of the trucking sector vis-a-vis the
railroads in the shipment of general commodities
in less-than truck (car)load lots. This
effect is not particularly serious since trucking
firms already enjoy a price advantage in this
sector (due to lower costs and better level of
service) and they would thus enter this market
even in the absence of rate of return regulation.
* As shown by the Averch-Johnson thesis regulated
trucking firms will have a motive to compete
with railways even in new markets where they do
not enjoy a price advantage and where they will
have to take a long run loss. This implies that,
as a result of rate of return regulation, the
trucking sector will have an inducement to move
into the transport of specialized commodities in
truck(car)load lots, where it is generally at
a cost disadvantage with the railroads.
In the context of developing countries this second effect of
regulation is particularly important since it may fundamentally
affect the process of investment in transportation infrastructure
in a number of ways:
(i) Sunken Investment versus New COnstruction
The railway network represents, in most developing countries
a substantial amount of sunken capital investment which, if maintained
and/or rehabilitated properly, generally has a significant expected
useful life left during which it can continue to provide transportation
services for which the railroads continue to enjoy a comparative cost
advantage (CL transport of specialized commodities, unit trains, etc.).
An expansion of truck hauling of specialized commodities will not only
considerably deteriorate the existing road system (given the type
of equipment and the frequencies of service involved) but will,
in addition, require significant new investment in highway infrastructure
that is capable of handling the new volumes and loads.
In essence therefore, the shift of this type of cargo from
the railways to trucking will require substantial capital investment
in new right-of-way infrastructure and decreased utilization, and
probably less maintenance, of already established infrastructure in
which important amounts of capital have already been sunken. In the
capital scarce environment of a less developed country such a policy
appears to be, at the very least, questionable.
(ii) Duplication of Transportation Links
The investment inefficiency discussed in (i) above is
further aggravated by the fact that the shift of bulk commodities
from railroads to trucking will, very often, result, in the long run,
in parallel duplication of transport links operating (at least in
one case) below right-of-way volume capacity.
(iii) Increased Losses in the Railroads
Railroads have experienced, in recent years, considerable
losses in most developing countries. As economic conditions change
in the development process, they find it increasingly hard, due to their
structural rigidity and to organizational and managerial deficiencies,
to cope with newly arisen problems.
By virture of being government owned and operated, they
have not exerted strong political pressure for capital funds, as
long as real or monetary salaries have been maintained, even in cases
where under or disinvestment has taken place. As a result, both
their infrastructure and equipment have generally deteriorated con-
siderably. In addition, limitations on income caused by government
imposed "sticky" price structures; overstaffing and labor inefficiency
determined by public employment generation and strong labor unions;
managerial deficiencies due to lack of adequately prepared personnel;
and losses of traffic volume to an increasingly aggressive trucking
sector have all combined to push the railroads in most less developed
countries further and further into deficit.
It has been frequently argued [Friedlander (1979), Mohring
(1976)] that the transportation of specialized bulk commodities in
carload shipments between specific geographical locations is one of
the areas in which the railroads maintain an important comparative
cost advantage and where newly developed rail technology could be
successfully applied to accentuate said advantage even further.
By stimulating the competition of the trucking sector in
this area at a long run loss, rate-of-return regulation may con-
siderably help to deprive the railroads of one of the few profitable
markets which they have left and to further worsen their presently
difficult financial and operating situation by diverting public
funds from the railways to highway construction programs and by
increasing their losses. This, on its turn, will lead to less
track and equipment maintenance and replacement, more level of
service deterioration and further market contraction and financial
losses.
(iv) Comparative Energy Efficiency
In addition to resulting in an inefficient allocation
of transport investment funds, indirect government "subsidization"
of trucking firms in traditional railway markets through rate-of-
return regulation will have important implications for energy con-
sumption and the balance of payments in non-oil producing less
developed countries. The railroads are clearly more energy efficient
long-haul transporters of bulk specialized commodities than trucks
[Roberts and Kneafsey (1975)]. A shift of volume in this market segment
from the former to the latter will determine an increase in energy, and
specifically oil, consumption which can hardly benefit non-oil
producing developing countries already faced with considerable oil
related balance of payment difficulties.
Summarizing then, developing countries are in general
presently facing difficult choices in the allocation of investment
funds between the railroad and the highway sector. Many of them
have developed rather comprehensive and ambitious highway construction
programs responding, in part, to the belief, probably inspired by
the example set by more developed nations, that highway development is
a prerequisite for overall economic development and, in part, to politi-
cal pressures from existing and potential trucking entrepreneurs. As
a result of these new and substantial demand for capital in the high-
way sector, less resources have been made available to the railroads
further worsening their already weak financial and operating position
which has been caused, to a large extent, by a loss of market to
trucking and by consequently poor financial performance, inadequate
maintenance of track and equipment and inefficient management.
Within this changing railroad/trucking equilibrium, rate-of-return
regulation of trucking firms may have contributed, by indirectly "sub-
sidizing" their entry at a loss in specialized commodity markets, to
accelerate the market share loss of the railroads even in areas where
they still hold a comparative cost advantage and to encourage the growth
of demand for highway construction. In addition, rate-of-return regu-
lation is likely to hvae caused an escessive and socially inefficient use
of imported capital equipment vis-a-vis labor in the trucking sector.
The potential detrimental consequences of these effects for trans-
portation investment in the capital and foreign exchange scarce environ-
ment of less developed countries should be again emphasized.
In the particular case of Egypt, it is clear that the relative
shift from railroads to trucks in freight transportation has been con-
siderable, and that the financial losses of the railways as a result of
this shift has been significant. As discussed in 3.2 above, the
trucking sector has expanded into areas where railways have traditionally
had comparative cost advantage. Even though it is very difficult to
determine to what extend the appearance of railroad undercapacity and
the shift in freight volume have been caused by market regulations (in
view of the fact that there is an important public trucking sector in
Egypt and that the private trucking sector is mainly composed of co-
operatives), it is important to take the issues discussed above into
consideration, particularly since an expansion of the relative freight
market share of the railroads appears to be at the moment a primary
objective of Egyptian transportation policy.
3.3.2 The Effects of Market Regulation on the Quality of Service
Our analysis of the effects of market regulation on the level of
service in transportation and their consequences for investment in the
sector will be based on the model developed by White (1972). This
model is based on the basic assumption that quality of service
variables are essentially a secondary output of a firm complementary
to its primary output. As a second output of the firm, a quality
parameter has two important characteristics. First, it influences
the market demand for the firm's primary output, either by
affecting the overall market demand for the product or by changing
the firm's relative share of the total unchanged market demand or by
a combination of the two effects.
Second, it is connected to the primary product, both in
production and consumption. If we assume that the secondary quality
output is viewed by consumers as being identical across all firms in
the industry, then the only possible quality difference among firms
is the variation in the level of service provided by various firms as
perceived by consumers. Two types of quality variables can complement
the primary product; an "operation" quality variable that is produced
and consumed in units that are tied directly to each unit of primary
product (the time reliability of a given trip for example) on a
"fixed" quality variable which is not tied to units of primary output
but is, instead, set at an overall level (e.g., a conveniently located
terminal) and does not, in the short run, vary directly with primary
output.
The difference between these two kinds of quality variables
is similar to that which exists between variable and fixed costs;
in the long run all costs (and all quality parameters) are variable,
but in the short run some costs are fixed and some quality parameters
do not vary directly with output.
The model's hypotheses are that there is an industry composed
of n firms subjected to market regulation which produce a basic
output, transportation, and two secondary quality aspects (one fixed,
the other variable). Furthermore, the overall market demand functions
for transportation and level of service are supposed to be complementary
and, at the limit, independent. A mathematical treatment of the model
is contained in Appendix 4; a summary of its conclusions is given in
3.3.2.1 below.
3.3.2.1 Conclusions of the Level of Service Model [White (1972)]
As shown in Appendix 4 the model has important implications for
the analysis of the effects of market regulation on the transportation
level of service. Its conclusions can be summarized as follows:
e A competitive or oligopolistic industry under
market regulation will offer more quality per
primary output unit than would a pure monopolist*
*Empirical evidence supporting this point is given by Caves (1962) for
the airline industry.
r In consequence, a regulated competitive or
oligopolistic industry will sell more units of
the primary product than will a regulated monopolist.
* The level of quality per unit of primary product
that will be provided by a competitive or
oligopolistic regulated industry will be
positively related to the price set by the
regulatory agency.
* The monopolist's quality response to price
changes is not predictable a priori. In
particular, if the demand for transportation
becomes less responsive to the level of
service as the price of transportation
increases, then quality per unit might
actually decrease rather than increase as
a result of a price rise.
* Finally, a decrease in the regulated price
will not necessarily cause an increase in
the quality of transportation services
demanded.
* The same above conclusions apply for the case
of fixed overall quality of service.
3.3.2.2 Implications of the Effects of Market Regulation on Level
of Service for Transportation Investment in Developing
Countries.
The conclusions of this model on the effects of market regulation
as described in 2.1.1 above on level of service have important
implications for transportation investment in less developed
countries, particularly on the distribution of capital resources
between the railroad and the highway sectors.
As was mentioned in 3.3.1.3 above, the railroads are a publicly
owned and operated monopoly in most developing countries and are
therefore subjected to rate of return regulation where it is
reasonable to assume that, in general, the rate of return sl is
less than the market cost of capital r1. On the other hand, the
trucking firms can be usually considered to be oligopolistic and is
also under government market regulation with sl > r1.
Given these characteristics and in the light of the level of
service model discussed above we can conclude that the market
regulation may have affected the comparative railroad/trucking
levels of service in the following ways:
Deterioration of Railroad Level of Service
Since the railroads operate as monopolists in the sense
that they usually do not follow an aggressive strategy of
capturing market from the trucking sector but rather continue
to operate defensively by attempting to maintain their market share
through low prices, we can expect that, given market regulation and
the oligopolistic or competitive character of trucking in most
developing countries, for a common price the quality of service
of the railroads will be lower than that of competing trucking firms.
Thus market regulation of trucking and railroads will favor the
creation of a level of service differential between the two modes
that will accentuate the one arising from the financial difficulties
experienced by the railways which have already been discussed.
As a result of this difference in quality of service
(expressed in terms of disparities in waiting and travel time,
time reliability, breakage and pilferage, etc.) a change in the
composition of freight carried by the two modes will occur over
time as high value concentration commodities shift from railway
to highway transportation. This transfer accelerates with economic
development since as developing countries diversify their production
by moving gradually from the exploitation and export of bulky, low
value concentration primary commodities into the manufacture and
export of less bulky, high value concentration industrial goods
transport requirements tend to de-emphasize low cost and to stress
lower risk and higher reliability of the system. The shift which
is considerable in terms of freight ton-miles is even more
important in revenue-miles, as the railroads become increasingly
limited to the transport of low value primary commodities.
We can, therefore, conclude that market regulation, by
encouraging level of service differentials, may have accelerated the
switch of high value commodities (including passengers) from the
railroads to trucking and bus transportation. This transfer
of transport revenue away from the railways is undoubtedly responsible
to a large extent for the deterioration of the railroads financial
and operating situation.
The Effect of Price Increases on Level of Service
While in the case of the oligopolistic or competitive trucking
firms it is clear from the theory that a price increase will result
in an improvement in the level of service, it is possible that
a rise in railroad fares results in an even lower quality of rail
service. As we have argued, the quality differential between
rail and trucking transportation have led, in developing countries,
to a considerable shift in high value commodities from the former
to the latter.
If under these circumstances an increase in railway prices takes
place, some additional transfer of high value freight is likely to
occur. In that case the ex-ante average value of freight will be
higher than that of the ex-post average and it is conceivable that,
as a result, the shippers' demand responsiveness to changes in quality
decreases. If this reduction is of sufficient magnitude we have,
according to the theory, that the price increase will actually result
in a deterioration of the level of service.
Summarizing then, government imposed price rigidity has been
often blamed [Due (1979)] for the poor quality of railroad trans-
portation in less developed countries. Our analysis shows though that,
given market regulation and under some assumptions that are likely
to hold in LDC's, railroad level of service might worsen even in the
face of rising prices.
In conclusion, market regulation has accentuated quality
differences between rail and truck transportation and has therefore
speeded up the shift of the high value commodity market segment from
the former to the latter in developing countries. The resulting
transfer of demand and, especially of revenue has had and will continue
to have important implications for transportation investment.
(For a discussion of these refer to 3.3.1.3 above).
This argument is particularly relevant in the case of Egypt where
the loss of traffic of the railroads to the trucking sector has been
substantial and where the transport authorities are presently attempting
to induce a comeback of the railways. Level of service is clearly an
important component of transportation cost and thus will significantly
influence the decision of a shipper as to the mode to choose. If market
regulation provides an incentive for truckers to maintain a higher level
of service while no such incentive is given to the railroads, then it
is in the government's interest, if the volume expansion of the rail-
ways is to be achieved, to establish strict quality control in the
sector that will ensure that quality of service equilibrium is established
with other modes.
3.3.3 THE EFFECTS OF MARKET REGULATION ON TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION
3.3.3.1 The Theory of Innovation and Regulation
The timing of the process by which regulation acts to eliminate
the Ricardian rents of an innovating firm has a significant effect
on the rate of technological innovation of said firm since it will
modify the magnitude of the financial incentive that the firm has to
introduce new technology. The concept is illustrated in Figures 3-3(a)
and (b). In Figure 3-3(a) the regulated firm has an average cost
curve ACo and a marginal cost curve MC ; these costs include a rate
of return on capital which is equal to the maximum rate of return s
allowed by the regulatory agency. The firm faces a less than perfectly
elastic demand D; the regulated price has been set at po where the
demand curve intersects the average cost curve, that is, economic
profits for the firm are zero; output is q . We will further assume
that the price level p(t) is dynamic; the regulatory body has the
ability to change it over time to adjust for changes in the firm's cost
structure, which always includes a rate of return on capital s. In
Figure 3-3(b) the firm has introduced a technological innovation which
has reduced its average and marginal cost curves to AC, and MC,
respectively. Let t = 0 be the time at which the innovation is
introduced. At t = 0 the regulated price is still p0 and output
volume continues to be q . The firm is now making a positive
economic profit n = qo[po-AC (q1)] = qoPo - fqo MC (q)dq (3-24)q = 0
We therefore have that the regulatory agency will reduce the
regulated price until p = p1 where p1 is determined by the inter-
section of the demand curve D and the new average cost curce AC1
dpt) < 0 0 < t< T (3-25)dt
kim P(t) = Pl (3-26)
t-÷T
where T is the period of total regulatory price adjustment.
If the inverse market demand function is given by
q = b(p) (3-27)
we have that the total gross economic profits accrued to the firm as
a result of technological innovation are given by
(T,r) = fT [p(t) p(t) - [P(t)]MC(q)dq] e-rt dt (3-28)
t=0 q =0
where r is the market rate of return (cost) of capital.
By changing the length of T, the regulatory review period, the regulatory
body can control the magnitude of the Ricardian rents and, thus, the
level of financial incentive permitted for technological innovation.
Given a value of T, the firm will select an optimal level of inno-
vative activity. The mathematical derivation of said optimal level
is given in Appendix 5.
As proved in the Appendix, the level of technological innovation
will be directly and positively related to the length of the regulatory
review period; the shorter the regulatory lag the less the regulated
firm will invest in technological innovation.
3.3.3.2 Implications of the Theory for Transport Investment in
Developing Countries
This result has important consequences for railroad-trucking
competition in less developed countries and, through it, on the
relative modal demands for transportation investment.
The level of service in any transport mode will, in general,
be positively correlated with degree of technological innovation since
better technology will improve service both directly, and indirectly
by allowing higher profits that can be later, at least in part,
ploughed back into the firm. In consequence, less innovation will,
in the long run, cause a deterioration in the quality of service
and will thus affect the demand for the firm's product.
As we have seen before, railroads are, in most developing
countries, government owned and operated, whereas trucking companies
are, to a large extent, private enterprises subject to government
regulation. Within this framework of operation we would expect
the railroads to have a considerably shorter regulatory review period
than the trucking sector and, therefore, a much smaller incentive
to invest in new technology. In fact, in the particular case when
the government operated railway enterprise is currently experiencing
financial losses the review period will have zero length; that is,
an introduction of new cost-saving technology will only have the
effect to reduce the losses of the enterprise and, in consequence,
the magntidue of government subsidies. Nevertheless, since the
government would have taken care of these additional losses through
larger subsidies anyway, it is clear that the firm has no incentive
whatsoever to be innovative even if the funds should be made available
for that purpose. It should be emphasized that this is the case
that will most likely be encountered in the majority of developing
countries. In the more unlikely event that the public railway company
is not making a loss, the review period will still be limited in its
length by the government budget process and will thus generally be
limited to a maximum of one year.
Since the government control of the private trucking firms, by
virtue of being indirect and of depending on privately generated
information, is more relaxed, we can safely assume that the regulatory
lag for said firms will be significantly longer than for even a
profitable public railroad firm. In conclusion then, the trucking firms
will have a stronger incentive to introduce technological innovations
than railway firms in less developed countries.
The effect of such a differential in innovative activities on the
quality of service will be considerable, particularly since, given that
railroads operate and maintain their own tracks and traffic systems,
the resulting relative obsolescence of the railways will not be limited
to their rolling stock but will extend, in addition, to the rights of
way, terminals, traffic and signalling, etc. (sectors whose tech-
nological development in the highway sector is the responsibility of
government agencies and, therefore,independent of the trucking firms'
desire to invest or not.
The technological obsolescence of the railroads vis-a-vis the
trucking sector can be observed in many developing countries, and, as
discussed above, is clearly recognizable in the case of Egypt; in
their tracks, their locomotives, their rolling stock, their marshalling
yards, and the signalling equipment. It is often blamed on a lack of
investment resources and on the poor financial situation of the
enterprises; as our model shows though, even if the resources were
available the railways might not invest in new technology given
that, as a result of being government owned and operated, they lack
the economic incentive to engage in innovative activities. This
factor again points out to the fact that government market regulation
has, by discouraging technological innovation in the railroads, has
accelerated the deterioration of their level of service vis-a-vis
the trucking sector and encouraged the shift of freight demand from
the former to the latter. Such a shift has expanded, as we discussed
before, the demand for new investment in the highway network while
it has encouraged the underutilization and abandonment of a sub-
stantial sunken investment in the railway system.
3.4 THE EFFECTS OF OPERATING REGULATIONS ON TRANSPORTATION
INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Until now we have concentrated on the analysis of transportation
market regulations and on their effect on investment in the sector
in less developed countries. As was mentioned before though,
operating regulations will also have a significant impact on the
level and time and space allocation of transport investment; in this
section we will concentrate on the study of three operating regulations
on the trucking sector which can be found in virtually any country:
axle load limitations, total weight limits and truck size specifications.
As has been argued by Crandall (1979) operating regulations are
essentially different from market regulations. In the case of the
latter there appears to be agreement among economists on the fact
that they tend to raise the cost of transportation above what it would
be without regulation, but both market and public opinion forces tend
to limit the additional costs that the regulatory agencies can impose
on the rest of society. If prices are set too much higher than the
cost of production, customers will seek alternative sources of trans-
port services supply. In the U.S., for example, the decision by
the Interstate Commerce Commission to allow value-of-service pricing
for interstate trucking which in many densely travelled corridors
exceeds the cost of service has led shippers to find alternative,
unregulated forms of carriage. Furthermore, decisions to set rates
at excessively high levels generally bring about public scrutiny of
the responsible agency; as a result, public reaction to rising utility
rates has been, in the U.S., an important constraint on public
utility regulatory commissions.
These automatic correcting forces do not exist in the area
of operating regulations, be they motivated by safety or design
standards considerations. A transportation firm has no alternative
but to comply with a mandatory operating regulation if the regulatory
agency has sufficient enforcement power at its disposal. Moreover,
the cost of said regulation to the firm, and ultimately to the user
who will be the one to pay for it, cannot be directly observed, since
it cannot be discerned from other costs which are incurred in the
production of the service. And since operating regulations usually
involve issues of design limitations and/or safety that a regulator
can invoke to justify his actions, even if the costs of the regulation
can be isolated, an evaluation of its appropriateness is still difficult.
Operating regulations have very substantial effects on transport
investment. They affect the supply side of transportation by deter-
mining the level of deterioration and safety of the infrastructure
and thus the requirements for maintenance work and new investment.
They also influence the demand side since, by changing the operating
characteristics of individual firms, they modify their cost structure
and therefore the price they charge for their services.
In order to analyze these effects in more detail in the
context of less developed countries, we will turn our attention
in the following sections to three specific operating regulations
which are applied to the trucking sector in most countries: axle
load and total truck weight limitations and truck size specifications.
3.4.1 Axle Load and Total Truck Weight Limitations
Axle load and total truck weight limitations are an important
component of trucking operating regulation in most countries. They
have generally been established in response to the need to preserve
the quality of highway systems and to retard the excessive pavement
deterioration that vehicle weights in excess of the road maximum
design standards may cause. They are therefore considered to be
important regulatory complements to highway investment programs since,
it is argued, they contribute to: (i) slow down the pace of real
depreciation of newly constructed infrastructure and (ii) diminish
the amount of resources needed for maintenance of said infrastructure.
While the effects of axle load and total truck weight limitations
on investment in construction and maintenance of highway infrastructure
have been generally understood and used by regulatory agencies to
justify their usefulness and application, less attention has been
paid on the public sector to the consequences that these operating
regulations have had for the operations and cost structures of indi-
vidual trucking firms and on transport economic efficiency, modal
split and energy use. Since all these areas of highway freight trans-
portation are clearly influenced by vehicle weight regulations, an
analysis of these relationships is warranted if the overall effect
of said regulations on transport investment is to be evaluated.
Furthermore, an appraisal of these issues in developed countries could
prove very useful in providing transport planners and policy makers
in developing countries with a broader perspective of the problems
and tradeoffs involved in the matter.
Developing countries which have chosen to engage in compre-
hensive and ambitious highway construction programs have found that
these programs have absorbed a very substantial proportion of
available investment resources for a considerable number of years
and, moreover, that after a certain point, deterioration of the
system has picked up with or even surpassed the pace of new con-
struction creating an additional and growing demand for highway
maintenance funds. The case for the protection of such major invest-
ment from excessively fast deterioration is therefore quite clear
and, in our opinion, beyond argument.
With respect to weight limitations on trucks though, several
important issues arise which have to be carefully considered:
* To what extent is abnormal pavement wear
brought about by abuse of the system, in
the form of excessive axle loads and vehicle
weights, by truck traffic?
* What are the tradeoffs between infrastructure
construction and maintenance costs, and truck
operating costs caused by more or less severe
weight regulations?
* If abnormal pavement deterioration occurs
because of excessive axle loads and/or vehicle
weight, is it the result of too lenient
regulations or of lax enforcement?
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* Should the problem be corrected by stricter
weight limitations or by higher truck taxes?
@ Should weight limitations be set at the
national or regional level.
3.4.1.1 Truck Weight and Pavement Deterioration
The relationship that exists between truck weight and
highway design standards is one that is difficult to explain, given
its technical character and the multitude of interacting parameters,
concepts, criteria and design standards, and quite controversial.
There is thus generally no unique answer to the question of what
specific weight a pavement is designed for. This is not because
vehicle weight is not an important part of any pavement design
procedure (as it surely is) but, rather, because of the fact that,
very often in practice, the same axle load and weight limits are
used for pavements of different thicknesses under similar conditions
or pavements of the same thicknesses have different weight regulations
under similar conditions.
In response to this relative uncertainty several pavement
deterioration tests were conducted by AASHO (American Association
of State Highway Officials) in the 1950-1960 decade. The AASHO
Road Test was the largest and most comprehensive of these experiments;
it introduced new concepts into pavement design thinking, and
provided new tools for use in pavement design which contributed
to improve design techniques and to create a measure of uniformity
in the subject. In its broadest sense, the applications and inter-
pretations of the AASHO Road Test can be classified into two
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categories. The first category includes the observations of the
road test, as supported by experience and subsequent research,
which represent reasonable applications of the research findings
to new concepts of pavement. The second group consists mainly of
applications of said findings to pavement deterioration prediction
and prevention.
Figure 3-2 illustrates the concept of pavement wear as
analyzed by the AASHO Road Test. A mean deterioration graph is
given together with a 90% confidence interval. The vertical axis
shows the subjective, non-dimensional pavement condition rating.
The horizontal axis depicts the cumulative traffic in terms of
18,000 pound single axle load equivalents. In addition, the relative
performance of two highway pavements are shown; A(which has carried
no truck traffic) and B(which has carried a very heavy concentration
of truck traffic). As shown by the graph, the "no truck" road A
has performed far worse than the Road Test predicts, and the "heavy
truck" road B has performed much better than forecasted by the test.
Both points are outside the 90% confidence interval of the AASHO
wear curve, which predicts pavement deterioration for a portland
cement pavement that is 9 inches thick as determined by the AASHO
Road Test equations.
The evidence shows that traffic and traffic weight are not the
only factors that influence pavement performance. They are
nevertheless important factors which have been shown to significantly
and positively affect pavement deterioration. We can therefore
conclude that:
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(i) Axle load and total weight limitations should
be imposed that are within the maximum design
standards of pavements and bridges respectively.
(ii) Failure to impose or enforce said standards will
cause a more rapid deterioration of highway
pavement and bridge infrastructure, shortening their
useful life and increasing the demand for highway
maintenance funds. The magnitude of the increase
in deterioration will depend upon other road
and environmental conditions.
3.4.1.2 The Cost of Weight Limitations to Truck Operators.
Axle load and total weight limitations clearly impose certain
additional costs on truck operators. They influence their choice
of equipment and, by limiting their maximum legal payload, they
determine the allocation of fixed costs (depreciation of equipment,
interest on capital, insurance) and variable costs (fuel, oil, tires,
driver's and helper's wages) per ton of commodity transported. There
exists therefore a tradeoff between infrastructure construction and
maintenance costs and truck operating costs in the determination
of the "optimum" axle load and weight limits.
From a social point of view, the incidence of these costs is
significantly different. Excessive deterioration of the highway
infrastructure will not only adversely affect all other users of
the system but will, in addition, cause an accelerated depreciation
of the investment and an increased need for maintenance, both of
which will result in a larger demand for public funds and, therefore,
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either in an impoverishment of this or other services or in higher
taxes. The increase in trucking costs, on the other hand, will
only affect users of truck transportation services, if it is
reflected in higher prices, or truck operators, if it results in
lower profits, or both, if it impedes the transport of certain
goods by truck. In any case, the incidence of an increase in truck
costs as a result of axle load and/or weight limitations will be
much narrower in social terms and less significant from an economic
development point of view than the excessive use of investment funds
in the highway sector that the absence or exagerated relaxation
of said limitations could cause. Furthermore, the cost effects
will be more substantial in the case of trucking firms which are
engaged in the transportation of bulk, low value concentration
commodities since, as we have seen, they do not enjoy a comparative
cost advantage vis-a-vis the railroads and have often managed
to expand into these markets behind the protective barrier of govern-
ment regulation.
3.4.1.3 Recommendations
In view of these facts we can make the following recommendations
in relation to axle load and total weight regulations in less
developed countries:
* Under no circumstances should these limits be
relaxed beyond a level which is larger, by a
significant safety factor, than the maximum allowed
design standards of the highway system in question.
The protection of the important capital investment
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that many developing countries have devoted
to the construction of highway networks is
too crucial a factor for socio-economic
development to be sacrificed for the benefit
of a narrow group of trucking operators and/or
users.
e Weight limitations clearly affect to a larger
extent those truck operators who are engaged
in the penetration of markets which traditionally
and from an economic efficiency point of view
belong to the railroads. By manipulating these
limits the government could not only avoid
excessive deterioration of the highway system
but could, in addition, protect the railroads'
traditional markets and avoid economic inefficiency
in transportation.
* Weight regulations, once implemented, should be
strictly enforced. Only in this way will they
perform their function. This implies, of course,
more investment in fixed and portable scales and
trained personnel.
* Weight regulations should be set at a common
national, rather than regional, level to avoid
costly rerouting and operator uncertainty.
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e Finally, truck taxes should be levied
to contribute in the construction and
maintenance of highways. Subsidizing
the trucking sector by providing free
or very cheap rights of way will only
contribute to create duplication of
transport links, inefficiency and
stagnation of the railways.
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3.4.2 Truck Size Limitations
Another important area of government operating regulations of the
trucking sector is that constituted by truck size limitations. These
limitations are imposed in order to ensure that the size of trucks
conforms to the design of the highways they are driven on and that
their operation does not imperil the safety of other vehicles which
share the roads with them. The trucking industry, on the other hand,
generally argues for less stringent limitations on truck and truck
combination dimensions which, in their view, would allow for more
efficient, more flexible, safe and more energy saving trucking
operations. As the positions of both sides show, the issues that are
involved in the problem of determining appropriate truck size stan-
dards are of particular relevance for developing countries.
3.4.2.1 Straight Truck Versus Tractor Trailers
In his paper on the relative advantages and disadvantages of
straight trucks and tractor trailers, Seibert (1977) includes results
of a survey he conducted on seven representative freight terminals
in the U.S. to determine the comparative labor productivity of both
types of equipment. The survey covered a period of two weeks (one
week for each type of truck) in which both the driver and the area
served remained constant. As Table 3-5 shows, the tractor trailer
combination was considerably more productive in terms of pounds per
man-hour than the straight truck.
Using the productivity figures of his survey, Seibert calculated
the net-after-tax present discounted value of two investment outlays,
one on three tractor-trailer combinations and one on four straight
108
TABLE 3-5
SURVEY RESULTS
1,551 845,227
TABLE 3-6
Tractor
Maintenance
$ 700
900
1,200
1,500
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STRAIGHT TRUCK 
TRACTOR-TRAILER
TERMINAL
F
TOTAL
LBS.
103,987
136,557
88,399
27,508
94,426
70,830
60,224
80,510
31,750
67,510
83,526
LBS.
105,651
71,917
64,616
22,729
57,102
51,881
27,220
56,543
53,140
51,064
50,294
LBS/HR
2,596
1,684
2,809
997
1,675
1,330
825
2,484
1,236
1,264
1,331
612,157 394,6 396.2 2,133
T-T
Maintenance
$ 800
1,000
1,300
1,600
Year
1
2
3
4
Truck
Maintenance
$ 600
700
800
1,000
Trailer
Maintenance
$100
100
100
100
TRACTOR-TRAILERTRUCK
HRS.
40.7
42.7
23.0
22.8
34.1
39.0
33.0
38.1
43.0
40.4
37.8
HRS.
35.9
41.4
31.8
23.5
34.1
39.0
39.0
39.0
35.2
38.1
39.2
LBS/HR
2,897
3,298
2,780
1,171
2,769
1,816
1,544
2,064
902
1,772
2,131
trucks (the four to three ratio is determined by their relative
pounds per man-hour productivities; 2,133 lbs/hr. divided by 1,551
lbs/hr. = 1.38). Three tractor-trailers can do the work of four
straight trucks on the average and thus one less driver will be
required; in the U.S. at today's rates, one driver is costing
$19,800 a year including base pay, social security, health and welfare,
pension and unemployment taxes. The differential tax effects of
depreciation are also considered in the study. Since three tractor
trailer units still cost more than four straight trucks, the annual
depreciation charges are greater; this will result in lower income
taxes. For tax purposes, all units are depreciated over an eight-
year life using the accelerated depreciation of double-declining
balance. Since trailers' useful life can be of up to eight years while
trucks and tractors will only last for four years, it is assumed that
trucks and tractors are traded in at book value at the end of the
fourth year and everything is traded in at book value at the end of
eight years. A tax rate of 50% was chosen.
Average prices used are $17,000 for a single axle tractor,
$6,000 for a 32' trailer and $13,000 for a straight truck. Maintenance
costs are given in Table 3-6, a $200 a year licensing difference in
favor of the straight truck and a 10% cost of capital are also assumed.
The total maintenance costs are tabulated in Table 3-7 and total
annual cash flows are summarized in Table 3-8. The operational cost
savings is the cost of one less driver C$19,800) reduced by the 50%
tax rate. Annual maintenance savings are also reduced by 50%.
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MAINTENANCE COST DIFFERENTIAL
T-T
Year Maintenance
1 $2,400
2 3,000
3 3,900
4 4,800
5 2,400
6 3,000
7 3,900
8 4,800
TABLE 3-7
NET TAX CASH FLOW
COST
3 Single-Axle Tractors
3 32' Trailers
Total
4 Straight Trucks
Difference
Investment Tax Credit Difference @ 10%
YEAR T-T BOOK ST BOOK T-T DEP
0
1 $69,000
2 39,000
3 22,875
4 13,969
5 56,695
6 29,771
7 15,593
8 8,777
$52,000
26,000
13,000
6,500
52,000
26,000
13,000
6,500
$30,000
16,125
8,906
5,086
26,924
13,818
7,176
3,789
$51,000
18,000
$69,000
52,000
$17,000
1,767 (1)
ST DEP NET DEP TAX SAVINGS
$1,767
$26,000 $4,000 2,000
13,000 3,125 1,513
6,500 2,406 1,203
3,250 1,836 918
26,000 924 429 (2)
13,000 818 409
6,500 676 338
3,250 539 269
(1) This figure is slightly different from 10% because the trucks and
tractors are only eligible for one-third of the credit because they
only last four years, instead of the eight necessary for the full credit.
(2) The normal 50% rate of $462 is reduced $33 because of the investment
tax credit differential.
1iI
ST
Maintenance
$2,400
2,800
3,200
4,000
2,400
2,800
3,200
4,000
T-T
License
$1,050
1,050
1,050
1,050
1,050
1,050
1,050
1,050
ST
License
$600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
T-T
Total
$3,450
4,050
4,950
5,850
3,450
4,050
4,950
5,850
ST
Total
$3,000
3,400
3,800
4,600
3,000
3,400
3,800
4,600
Difference
$ 450
650
1,150
1,250
450
650
1,150
1,250
TABLE 3-8
MEASURING THE BENEFIT OF PURCHASING THREE TRACTOR-SHORT
TRAILERS VS. FOUR STRAIGHT TRUCKS - NO INCREASE IN
FREIGHT: NET PRESENT VALUE METHOD
Operational
Cost Savings
$(17,000)
9,900
9,900
.9,900
9,900
9,900
9,900
9,900
9,900
Net Tax
Savings
$1,767"
2,000
1,513
1,203
918
429
409
338
269
Maintenance Net Cash
Savings Flow
$ $(15,233)
(225) 11,675
(325) 11,088
(575) 10,528
(625) 10,193
(225) 10,104
(325) 9,984
(575) 9,663
(625) 9,544
Net Present Value
Present Value
Cash Flow (10%)
$(15,233)
10,613
9,159
7,907
6,962
6,275
5,631
4,957
4,457
$40,726
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The project of investing in three tractor-trailer units instead
of four straight trucks is clearly a profitable one. The annual
cash flows are substantial, the payback period for the project
is around 16 months, and its internal rate of return is 69%. From
a financial point of view this is obviously a good investment, what-
ever investment evaluation method may be used. Nevertheless, the other
aspects of the project should also be taken into consideration:
e The productivity figures used in the financial
calculations are averages; as Table 3-5 shows
they will substantially change from terminal
to terminal depending on its location and the
traffic congestion existing within it.
* In addition to being able to carry more freight
per driver, the tractor-trailer combination
can load larger shipments. This allows for
the pickup of some shipments that do not fit
on a straight truck.
e A shipper is more likely to load an extra
shipment on a trailer simply because the
extra capacity is available.
* Additional tractors add to the flexibility
of the operation. If a tractor breaks down,
instead of having to re-handle all the freight
it is carrying (as would happen in the case of
a straight truck) the tractor can simply be
switched by another.
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3.4.2.2 Single Versus Twin Trailer-Tractor Combinations
The economic case for twin trailer-tractor combinations has
been argued for many years by the American Trucking Association in
the U.S. The present status of twin trailers in the United States
varies from region to region; virtually all Western and Midwestern
states permit the operation of twins equipment at the effective 65
feet length limit. These twins are also allowed in the Eastern
states of Maryland and Delaware; in all 31 states permit the 65
feet long twins. In addition, twin trailers at the lengths of 55 and
60 feet overall, which are less efficient, are allowed to operate in
four states and one state respectively. While the majority of states
authorize twins to operate unrestricted on all highways, eleven states
limit them to specially designated highways.
In a recent study of the operating characteristics of the twin
trailer the American Trucking Association (1978) concluded that:
e Twin trailer combinations consist of a truck
tractor drawing two short semi-trailers with an
overall length of 65 feet, only 5 to 10 feet
longer than the tractor-single trailer
now operating everywhere. Twin trailer units
are no wider, no higher and operate at no
greater weights than other trucks. Yet they
provide up to one-third more loading space for
light and bulky commodities and can reduce
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fuel consumption by more than 20 percent.Cl)
* Twin trailer combinations have operated in
and around the congested urban centers of
San Francisco, Chicago, and Cleveland for
many years. The two short trailers can be
readily disassembled to form two separate
small city delivery type truck units. This
has reduced urban congestion caused by trucks
as shorter units operate into the city center.
Twins' shorter trailers mean easier loading
for shippers, easier access to loading and
unloading facilities. Such greater flexibility
provides an opportunity for lower costs.
P Billions of miles of operating experience have
demonstrated that twin trailer combinations
are among the safest trucks on the road
today. Studies by state and Federal agencies,
including the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety
of the Department of Transportation and the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
have verified the safety of these combinations
when compared with any other vehicles on the
highways. Insurance company executives and
(1)The potential fuel savings in hauling one million tons of highway
freight in twin trailer combinations rather than in other truck
combinations are given in Tables 3-9 and 3-10.
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TABLE 3-9
CARRYING CAPACITIES AND FUEL USE FOR TYPICAL COMBINATIONS
Average Gross Maximum Number of Loads Fuel Consumption
Combination Payload Required to Carry Rate (Gallons
Weight Per Truck 1 Million Tons Diesel Fuel
Type of Combination (in pounds) (in tons) of Freight Per Mile)
55 FOOT TRACTOR SEMITRAILER
Light and Bulky Freight
With 411 Foot Semitrailer 60,725 16.0605 62,265 0.156
With 45 Foot Semitrailer 65,250 18.1250 55,172 0.161
Dense Freight
With 40 Foot Semitrailer - Old Limit 73,280 22.3400 44,763 0.169
- New Limit 79,000 25.2000 39,683 0.176
With 45 Foot Semitrailer - Old Limit 73,280 22.1400 45,167 0.169
- New Limit 79,000 25.0000 40,000 0.176
65 FOOT TWIN TRAILER
All Freight - Old Limit* 73,280 22.0515 45,348 0.167
Light and Bulky Freight - New Limit 76,677 23.7500 42.105 0.171
Dense Freight - New Limit 80,000 25.4115 39,352 0.175
NOTES: Gross weights based on typical vehicle configurations used in intercity service.
Number of loads (or trucks) required to move one million tons of freight computed by dividing payload (in tons) into 1,000,000.
Fuel consumption rates obtained from Cummins Engine Company's vehicle simulator computer based on a typical intercity trip (405 miles) at
a scheduled maximum speed of 55 miles per hour, utilizing current fuel saver equipment (engine, transmission, clutch fan, radial tires and air
deflecter).
As of 1975 states could raise gross weight restrictions to 80,000.
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TABLE 3-10
POSSIBLE PERCENTAGE SAVINGS IN TRUCK TRIPS AND
FUEL CONSUMED IN HAULING ONE MILLION TONS.OF
HIGHWAY FREIGHT IN VARIOUS TRUCK COMBINATIONS
Percent of Truck Percent of
Trips Saved Fuel Saved
Light and Bulky Freight
Substitute 45 foot for 40 foot Semitrailers 14.4% 8.5%
Substitute 65 foot Twin Trailers for 40 foot
Semitrailers
- At old Twin Trailer Weight Limit 27.2% 22.0%
- At new Twin Trailer Weight Limit 32.4% 25.9%
Substitute 65 foot twin trailers for 45 foot
Semitrailers
- At old Twin Trailer Weight Limit 17.8% 14.7%
- At new Twin Trailer Weight Limit 23.7% 18.9%
Dense Freight
Substitute new for old Weight Limits
- With 40 foot Semitrailers 11.3% 7.7%
- With 45 foot Semitrailers 11.4% 7.8%
- With 65 foot Twin Trailers 13.2% 9.1%
Substitute 65 foot Twin Trailers at new
Limit for
- 40 foot Semitrailer at old Limit 12.1% 9.0%
- 45 foot Semitrailer at old Limit 12.9% 9.8%
(Legal or Maximum Practical) Old Limit New Limit
Light and Bulky Freight
40 foot Semitrailer 60,725 60,725
45 foot Semitrailer 65,250 65,250
65 foot Twin Trailer 73,280 76,677
Dense Freight
40 foot Semitrailer 73,280 79,000
45 foot Semitrailer 73,280 79,000
65 foot Twin Trailer 73,280 80,000
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state safety administrators from their own
experience and records strongly support twin
trailer safety. They have been operated
over every type of terrain in all kinds of
weather with no problems. Tests have shown
that twin trailers track and turn better than
many other types of trucks, and that they have
stopping ability which is at least comparable
to any other combinations.
3.4.2.3 Recommendations
From the above facts we can conclude that the main arguments
of the trucking industry in favor of larger truck combinations
are based on the fact that they are more productive in terms of
pounds per man-hour of operation, that they provide more flexibility
to the operator, that they generate extra freight volume demand
by their greater capacity and that they are more fuel efficient.
The main government concerns on the matter are, on the other hand,
that larger trucks may negatively affect the operations of other
road users and that they may reduce highway safety and increase
congestion in urban areas.
In the context of developing countries, even though the
main issues remain the same, their relative weights are somewhat
different, given the differences that do exist both in economic
and transportation conditions. On the position of the trucking
industry it can be argued that higher productivity in terms of
pounds per man-hour for larger trucks is less of an advantage in
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developing countries where wages are relatively lower and where
capital and specially foreign exchange is scarce. From an economic
point of view a shift towards larger trucks is a shift towards
higher capital/labor and foreign exchange/labor ratios which in a
labor surplus economy will not necessarily result in an efficient
allocation of resources.
On the other hand, the fact that larger trucks are more fuel
efficient than smaller trucks is particularly significant in the
case of most less developed countries which are net oil importers.
It should be nevertheless emphasized again that trucks are a
considerably less fuel efficient transport mode than the railways;
in facilitating the erosion of railroad markets, particularly in
long range transportation *of bulky, low value concentration com-
modities, by allowing larger truck combinations on the road, the
government will be taking a position that may, in the long run,
result in more rather than less overall fuel consumption.
On the questions of safety of operation and highway congestion
it is clear that road infrastructure in most developing countries
is not up to U.S. or Western European standards. It may therefore
very well be the case that truck combinations that have circulated
without major problems in developed countries for years might cause
excessive congestion or deterioration of safety levels when trans-
ferred to developing countries with poorer road conditions.
Moreover, one of the greatest advantages of larger truck
combinations that has been heralded by the trucking industry in
developed countries is that they better adapt to the new character-
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istics of technologically advanced manufactures which tend to be
bound by volume rather than by weight constraints given the fact
that they contain increasing amounts of plastics, resins and
aluminum, and that they are usually packaged in plastic foam or
other low density material. The power of this argument is obviously
reduced in less developed countries in view of their different
composition of industrial production.
On the balance it appears that the argument for larger truck
combinations, and particularly for twin trailer units, is weaker in
developing countries than in the more advanced industrialized
nations. Authorization for larger combinations to operate on the
roads will cause an increase in the demand for government funds
for the construction of better, limited access highways, a deter-
ioration of road quality and safety, a worsening of congestion
problems, and further expansion of the trucking sector into rail-
roads. In the light of all these factors, the contention that
larger truck combinations are more labor productive and fuel
efficient than smaller ones seems to be weak indeed.
Within this framework of analysis the Egyptian situation is
somewhat unique. As discussed above, there is substantial excess
capacity (except for a few links) in this country's highway system to
accomodate the overflow traffic from the other modes during the time
required for planning and implementing the additional capacity in
those modes. During this period over which the highways will carry
large volumes of freight more suited to the other modes, care should
be taken to ensure that there are no restrictions of a nature which
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will inhibit or prevent the import or production of the necessary
quantity of large and more efficient highway vehicles. The ability to
use such large freight vehicles on relatively uncongested highways is
the only factor which has prevented the shortage of capacity in rail-
ways and waterways from having more serious consequences.
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4.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ;
Given the importance of the transportation sector both as a
recipient of public funds and as a necessary factor for economic
development, government in developing countries have been particularly
concerned with exercising some degree of control over said sector.
This control has been materialized in the form of market and operating
regulations being imposed on the sector. Market regulations, on the
one hand, have been established generally in response to a desire
by the government to be able to control the effects of transportation
on socio-economic development; to the fact that transportation activi-
ties are often characterized by decreasing cost structures and econo-
mies of scale which force the government to intervene, through reg-
ulation, to defend the "public interest" in cases where existing or
potential natural monopolies threaten the efficient and equitable
operation of free markets; and to pressures from powerful interest
groups which are either involved in the provision of, or affected by,
transport services and which manage to obtain supportive or protective
regulation from the government.
Operating regulations, on the other hand, have evolved as a result
of considerations of efficient operation, design standards and levels
of safety.
As our study shows, market regulation of transportation may
have contributed in less developed countries to accelerate the
operating and financial decline of the railroads and the expansion
of the trucking sector by providing an incentive for trucking firms
to capitalize beyond the economically efficient capital/output ratio
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and to expand, even at a long run loss, into markets that have
traditionally, and from an economic efficiency point of view, be-
longed to the railways; and by providing a relative disincentive
for the railroads vis-a-vis trucking firms to maintain a high level
of service and to invest in new technology.
These mostly unintended potential consequences of transport
market regulation could have significant repercussions for trans-
portation investment in less developed countries:
* The overcapitalization of the trucking sector
is a particularly relevant problem for
developing countries where capital is, in
general, in very scarce supply and has a high
opportunity cost, and where usually are
vast supplies of surplus labor. Furthermore,
since most of the capital equipment utilized by
trucking firms is imported, a considerable
overexpenditure of foreign exchange could
result.
* The incentive to regulated trucking firms to
expand into railroad markets (particularly
the transportation of bulky specialized
commodities) will not only speed up the
deterioration of the existing highway system but
will, in addition, require significant new
investment in highway maintenance and con-
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struction of new infrastructure that is
capable of handling the new volumes and loads.
* Furthermore, the shift in freight from the
railways to highway transportation will result,
in the long run, in parallel duplication of
transport links operating sometimes below
volume capacity.
* By stimulating the competition of the trucking
sector in markets where the railroads have
comparative cost advantage, market
regulation may help to deprive the
railways of one of the few profitable
markets which they have left and to
further worsen the presently difficult
operating situation and large financial
losses.
* Finally, in a period of high energy prices
worldwide a relative expansion of
truck freight transportation at the expense
of the railroads will result in an increase
in energy consumption.
In conslusion, governments in less developed countries should
carefully evaluate the costs and benefits of transportation
regulation, taking into account not only its supposed "public
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interest" benefits, but also the inefficiency which they create
and, most importantly, the way in which, by protecting special
interest groups, they have affected the constitution of the
transportation sector and the supply of and demand for transport
investment funds. Moreover, in the crucial area of railroad-truck
competition an end to the regulatory market protection of trucking
firms should be considered, to put a halt to the continuous and very
costly deterioration of the railroads, and a firm position should be
taken against the demands by trucking firms for a relaxation of
operating regulations, which would permit them not only to make
further incursions into railroad markets but, in addition, to
deterioration at an accelerated pace the highway systems that
have been constructed in recent years at a very high social and
economic cost and for their virtually exclusive benefit.
As our analysis suggests, considerable work remains to be
done in the area of transportation regulation and its effect on
investment in the sector in less developed countries. In particular,
we propose two alternative directions for future research on the
subject to take:
(i) Further investigation of the objectives envisioned
by the governments in developing countries when
imposing both market and operating regulations on
the transport sector.
(ii) Empirical verification in the particular field of
transportation of the above discussed theories
on the effect of market regulations on capital
investment, competition, level of service and
technological innovation.
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APPENDIX 1 - THE SOCIAL COST OF MONOPOLY
Since the monopolistic firm faces a less than perfectly elastic
demand, its output decision will, in fact influence the good's
market price.
If we assume that the monopolist will maximize profits 11 we
have:
H = p(q).q - c(q) (Al-1)
where
p(q) is the market price
c(q) is the total cost of production
q is the quantity produced
Maximizing profits we get:
d-T = p(q) + q d
=d p(q)(1 + I/E D )
where
0D dp/p
d [p(q).q] _ dc(g)
dq dq
_ dc(q)
dq
0O
=0
(Al-2)
(Al-3)
The monopolist will therefore produce at q0 where the marginal cost
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Pl
q
FIGURE Al-1 PRICING IN A MONOPOLY MARKET
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curve intersects the marginal revenue curve. The price charged will be
Po.
MC = MR = Po (l+1/D) < Po (Al-4)
since cD < 0
In this case the monopolist will earn positive long run economic
profits equal to q o(p-pl); it is therefore true that a firm in a
monopoly market can earn higher profits than if it were to operate
in a competitive market (note that in a purely competitive market
long run economic profits will always be zero). This does not
imply, though, that monopolies will always earn large "excess"
profits; two monopolies of equal "strength" can earn profits of very
different magnitude. A measure of monopoly strength has been pro-
posed by Lerner (1934); the degree of monopoly D is defined as the
divergence between marginal cost and price relative to the price.
As (Al-4)shows, a monopoly market will always be characterized by a
positive divergence between equilibrium price and marginal cost;
Lerner's definition measures this divergence.
D= - MC p - (dc(q)/dq) (Al-5)p p
At equilibrium MC = MR
= Po - MR p - pO(l + 1/WD) (Al-6)
. . D=
Po Po
1D =- (Al-7)
DApplying (Al3) to (Al)
Applying (AI-3) to (AI-5)
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0AC
D
MONOPOLY PROFITS FOR TWO FIRMS WITH EQUAL DEGREES OF MONOPOLY
P I
•=
I
FIGURE Al-2
Since we have that
MC > 0
then MR > 0 for a profit maximizing monopolist
'. p (1 + l) > 0
ED
and since ED 5 0 we have
ED " 1 (Al-8)
For a profit maximizing monopolist we have
D < 1 (Al-9)
And therefore
0 < D 1 (Al-1,0)
Note that under perfect competition ED--- -
Zim D = im ( ) = 0  (Al-11)
Two firms with similar degrees of monopoly power D may have
very different degrees of profitability as Figure AI-2) shows. The
level of profits will depend on the relative positions of the
average cost and the average revenue (demand) curves but not necessarily
on the degree of monopoly [Nicholson (1978)]. That is:
11 = p(q) - c(qo )  (Al-12)
= pq - 0  dc() dq (Al-13)
q 0 dq
q[1 o dc( dq]
Sq [ Po q dqqo dq] (Al-14)
q =0
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*0
FIGURE Al-3 DIFFERENTIAL EFFECTS OF PERFECT
COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN A MARKET
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The two monopolies in Figure Al-2 have the same degree of monopoly;
the monopoly in Al-la earns a high level of economic profits while
the one shown in Al-lb actually earns zero economic profits. The main
objection to monopoly profits is therefore not the inevitability of
the existence of such profits or their size (since, as we have seen,
these may vary with market characteristics), but rather, the distri-
butional effects of monopoly profits created by the relative income
and wealth distribution of both producers and consumers. If monopoly
profits are made by relatively well-off producers at the expense of
less well to do consumers, there may be validly objectionable,
independently of their size.
A second cost associated with monopolies is the distortion in
the allocation of resources that their existence will cause. By
restricting their output in order to maximize profits, monopolies
produce at an equilibrium output level qo[see Figure Al-3]
price consumers are willing to pay for the good is higher than the
marginal cost of producing it. From a social point of view, then,
output should be expanded.
Figure Al-3 compares the output that would be produced in a
given market under conditions of monopoly and perfect competition.
It is assumed that in both cases the firm will have constant marginal
costs as a simplification. A monopolist will choose an output
level of q atan average cost pl and he will sell it at price po.
Total monopoly profits are q (po-pl). Under perfect competition
the supplier would produce q1 at an average cost pland he will
sell it at p1. Economic profits are zero. By restricting his
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output the monopolist has not only gained a monopoly profit q (Po-pl)
at the expense of the consumer but has, in addition, deprived him of
the consumer surplus represented by the area BAE.
By regulating industries where decreasing costs occur over
the relevant range of output and thus where only one supplier would
subsist in the long run, the government can correct the inequity
(monopoly profits) and the inefficiency (output restriction) which
would arise from the competitive operation of a natural monopoly
market; the rationale for regulation in this case is therefore quite
clear.
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APPENDIX 2 - THE AVERCH-JOHNSON THEORY OF BEHAVIOR OF THE FIRM
UNDER REGULATORY CONSTRAINT [Averch and Johnson (1962)]
A2.1 THE SINGLE MRKEEI MCDE.L
We will assume for this problem a monopoly firm operating in
a single market with two factor inputs, labor and capital, which is
subjected to rate of return regulation where the allowed rate of
return is less than the rate that the firm would receive without
regulation but greater than the cost of capital. We will prove that
in this case the firm will substitute capital for labor to a point
where marginal rates of substitution are different from the factor
cost ratio and where, therefore, social cost is not minimized for
the given output.
Assume that the firm produces one homogeneous product using
the two inputs with the production function:
Q = Q(xl,x 2 )  (A2-1)
> 0 (A2-2)
> 0 (A2-3)
2
x > 0, x2  0 (A2-4)
Q(O,x 2) = Q(x1 ,O) = 0 (A2-5)
where
Q is the volume of output of the firm
x1 is the amount of capital used by the firm
x2 is the amount of labor used by the firm
The inverse demand function of the firm is given by
P = 0 (Q) (A2-6)
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Profit is defined by
i = P.Q - r1x1 - r 2 x2  (A2-7)
where
r1* is the (constant) unitary "interest" cost of capital
r 2  is the (constant) unitary cost of labor.
If we define:
C1 is the acquisition cost per unit of capital
U1 is the value of depreciation of capital during the considered time
interval
U1 is the cumulative value of capital depreciation
then the regulatory constraint can be defined as
P.Q - r2x2 - Ul < S1  (A2-8)22 1 U S1
Clx 1 - U1
where S1 is the maximum rate of return on capital allowed by the
regulatory agency.
For simplicity we assume
u= 0
U1 = 0U O
and define arbitrarily the unit of capital so that
cI = 1
The constraint (A2-8) can then be rewritten as
P.Q - r 2 x2 _ S1  (A2-9)
x1
P.Q - r 2 x2 - S1X 1 _ 0 (A2-10)
If S1 < rl we get from (A2-10)
I = P.Q - r1 x - r2 x2
= P.Q. - S1x1 + (S1-rl)x1 - r 2 x2 (S1 - rl)x <0
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and therefore the firm will not produce at all, that is, Q = x1 =x2 = 0
.'. S1  > r I  (A2-11)
The decision problem of the firm is then to maximize (A2-7) subject
to (A2-10)
The Lagrangian is defined by
L(x1x2X) = P.Q - r1x1 - r2 2 - X[P.Q - S1x1 - r 2 x2 ] (A2-12)
The Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions for a maximum are
rl > (1 - x) [P + Q dP] aQ + XS, X2 > 0 (A2-13)dQ Tx 1  1:
r1 .> (1 - X) [P + Q d-P] 3Q + XS1 implies x1 = 0 (A2-14)
(l-X)r 2 > (l-X)[P + Q dP] ;Q x2 > 0 (A2-15)
dQ ax2
(1 - X)r 2 > (1 - X)[P + Q d0P] Q implies x2 = 0 (A2-16)
dQ xx2
P.Q. - S1X1 - r2 x2 O0, • 0 (A2-17)
P.Q - r 2 x2 < S1X 1 implies X = 0 (A2-18)
If we assume A > 0 then from (A2-13) it is clear that X=l if and
only if rl = Sl. In this case any x1 ,x2 which satisfies (A2-17)
will be a solution.
For S1 > r1 we have 0 5 A < 1. From (A2-18) we get that if S1
is large enough then X = 0 (at some high level of allowable rate
of return S1 the value x1(S1 - rI) is larger than the unconstrained
maximized profit and the constraint becomes ineffective).
If we now let S1 - r I , Avaries continuously and given that A f 1
we have 0 k X < 1. For the unregulated monopoly the marginal
conditions are
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r1 =[P + Q dP] aq (A2-19)
dQ ax 1
r 2 =[P + Q dP] 3Q (A2-20)
dQ ax2
Under conditions of effective regulatory constraint (x > 0) we
have from (A2-15) and (A2-20) that, as in the case of an unregulated
monopoly, the input of x2 is such that its marginal cost r2 is equal
to its marginal revenue product. In contrast (A2-13) and (A2-19)
show that, under regulation, the input of x1 is such that its
marginal cost rI is greater thanits,marginal revenue product since
rl- hS1 - 1 ~r - - 2(S 1 - rl) > [ P + Q dP] 3Q
dQ ax 1
and therefore, given that 0 < A < 1 and S1 > r 1
r I > [P + Q dP] 3Q (A2-21)
dQ Dx1
From (A2-13) and (A2-15) when the equalities hold we have that
MRS1 dx =Q/xl (A2-22)MRS2  dx, aQ/ x2
Q=Qo0
.'. MRS 2 r22
r1 -Arl - xS1 + rl1  (A2-23)
r 2 (l - X)
1 rl A(S 1 - r I
' MRS 12 r 2  (1 - (A2-24)
Given that 0 < A < 1 and S1 > r we have
1  dx2 r (A2-25)
MRS2 dx1 r2
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FIGURE A2-1 THE AVERCH-JOHNSON THESIS; SINGLE MARKET CASE
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The regulated firm, therefore, adjusts to the rate of return constraint
by substituting capital (xl) for labor (x2), until the marginal rate
of substitution of capital for labor is less than the ratio of the
cost of capital to the cost of labor, and by expanding its total
output.
Rate of return regulation has made the "private" cost of capital
to the firm different from the market cost. For each additional
unit of capital used the firm can earn a profit equal to the
differential between the rate of return allowed by the regulatory
body (SO) and the market cost of capital. As a result private cost
is less than market cost by an amount equal to said difference.
Figure A2-1 shows the firm's possible choices of technology
and total output in a capital/labor diagram. The market "social"
relative capital/labor cost is given by line a; the smaller regulated
private relative capital/labor cost to the firm is determined by
line B. The level of total output is denoted by the homotetic isoquant
level curves Q . Without regulation the firm would produce output
QO at A and would be constrained to expand along path 1. If the
firm is regulated at rate S1 > rl it will, for constant total input
resources evaluate in terms of x2, expand output to Q1 at B and
it future expansion path will be 2.
A2-2 THE MULTIPLE MARKET CASE
Suppose that, in addition to operating in its original market,
the firm can also enter other regulated markets and the regulatory
"fair" rate of return is based on the overall value of the firm's
capital assets.
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Let us further assume, for simplicity, that operating
in a second market (2) allows the firm to act as an unconstrained
monopolist in its original market, and that any combination of
factors along the socially optimal expansion path in market 2
will result in zero economic profits in that market, that is
P2 Q2 - r1 X1 2 - r 2 x2 2 = 0 (A2-26)
dx22 r
V x x2  2d2 r 1 (A2-27)V X12 ,X2 2 1 - dx12  r
The overall regulatory constraint for n markets can be expressed as:
n n n
SPiQi -S1  x li - r 2 E x2i < 0 (A2-28)
i=l i=l i=2
If the unconstrained profit maximum vector in market 1 is (Qx1 1x21)
then we have
P1Q1 -Slx 1-r 2x21 = m, m > 0 (A2-29)
and, therefore, constraint (A2-27) would be violated if the firm
produced only in market 1. We then choose an output level Q2 on the
socially efficient path in market 2 such that
P 2Q - rx _ x = 0 (A2-30)2 2 22 12 2 
and
P2 - Sx - r22 =- m (A2-31)2 2 1 12 2-2212
Subtracting (A2-30) from (A2-29) we have
x12(S - rl) = m (A2-32)
.'. x12 = Sr (A2-33)
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Thus, the system (A2-33), (A2-27), (A2-26) determines the vector
(Q2,x'2,x22).
Given (A2-29) and (A2-31) we see that the firm will now
satisfy constraint (A2-28). While an unregulated monopolist would
be indifferent between producing in market 2 at (Q2 ,x2',x22), the
regulated firm finds market 2 attractive because it can add capital
to its rate base at no loss. Since in market 2 the cost of capital
is less than the allowed rate of return, the firm can use the
difference to satisfy its constraint in market 1 and enlarging
its profit by S1 - r1 for each unit of capital used in market 2.
Even if a loss is incurred in market 2 in terms of market prices
r l , r2 it will still pay the firm to operate in it as long as the
loss is smaller than X12(Sl - r l ), that is:
P2 Q2 - r1X12 - r2X22 < X12(S1 - r!) (A2-34)
.'. P2 Q2 - Sl 2 - r 2X2 2 < 0 (A2-35)
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APPENDIX 3
A Test of the Averch-Johnson Thesis Using
The Trascendental-Logarithmic Production Function
[Spann (1974)]
The Averch-Johnson model assumes that the regulated monopoly firm
produces a homogeneous output using at least two inputs. In the case
of the electric utility industry, on which this statistical study is
based, there are three inputs: capital, labor and fuel. The regula-
tory agency constrains the firm to a maximum fixed rate of return on
its capital investment; it is assumed that this allowed rate of return
is greater than the firm's cost of capital but less than the rate of
return the monopoly firm would obtain if it would not be subjected to
rate of return regulation.
If we assume, further, that the firm's objective is to maximize
profits subject to the regulatory constraint, we can express the firm's
decision problem mathematically as a Lagrangian (note that the regula-
tory constraint is set as an equality):
Max [R(K,L,F) - wL - rK - gF
K,L,F
- X[R(K,L,F) - wL - gF - sK]] (A3-1)
where
Q is the firm's output
K is the amount of capital employed bythe firm
L is the amount of labor employed by the firm
F is the amount of fuel used by the firm
P is the price of the firm's output
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r is the cost of capital
w is the wage rate
g is the price of fuel
s is the allowed rate of return
R(K,L,F) is the firm's revenue function given by
R(K,L,F) = p[f(K,L,F)].f(K,L,F) (A3-2)
. R(K,L,F) = ý(Q)/-(K,L,F) (A3-3)
• R(K,L,F) = P.Q (A3-4)
where
P = C(Q) is the firm's inverse demand function
Q = f(K,L,F) is the firm's production function
First order conditions for a maximum are obtained by differentiating
equation (A3-1) with respect to K, L, F and X.
aR r h8R s 0D-R -r + s- = (A3-5)TK - K
aR w X3R Xw 0
DR a a:R AX 0
TF -F
R(K,L,F) - wL - gF - sK = 0
These equations are equivalent to:*
DR r h (r-s)
DR w
tL
DR g
aF
R(K,L,F) = wL + gF + sK
* For second order conditions see Baumol and Klevorick (1970)
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(A3-6)
(A3-7)
(A3-8)
(A3-9)
(A3-10)
(A3-11)
(A3-12)
since as proved by Baumol and Klevorick (1970)
0 < X < 1.
Furthermore, since 1 - X > 0, equation (A3-9) implies that the reg-
ulated firm is too capital intensive given that, at equilibrium, the
marginal revenue product of capital is less than the cost of capital.
R _ r _ (r-s) < 0 (A3-13)
AK 1-x
since
0< < 1
r < s
In order to test the Averch-Johnson thesis, the trascendental-
logarithmic production function developed by Christensen, Jorgenson and
Lau (1970) is used by Spann (1974). This production function is a very
general production function of which the Cobb-Douglas and CES functions
are special cases:
log Q = log co + Býlog K + B21og L + B3log F
+ B4(log K)2 + B5(log L)2 + %$(log F)2
+ ý71og K log F + Bslog K log L + 91log F log L (A3-14)
By taking the logarithmic derivative of (A3-14) with respect to capital
K we obtain
alog Q B + 2B4 log K + B7log F + B8 log L (A3-15)
alog K
By definition
ilog Q 9Q K K
alog K = K - Q :K Q (A3-16)
where IK is the marginal product of capital
K =• (A3-17)
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If we assume that the monopolist is facing a constant elasticity demand
curve and differentiate (A3-4) with respect to Q we obtain:
3R P + Q dP _ P (1 + dP Q_)
aQ dQ dQ P
. P (1 + 1 )
9Q E
(A3-18)
(A3-19)
where E is the constant elasticity of demand.
. R _ 3R Q = P (1 +1 )f
AK 3Q aK E (A3-20)
Thus equation (A3-9) may be rewritten as
P (1 1 )K=
+
r + (r-s)+-X
Substituting (A3-21) into (A3-15) we obtain
K (r +kr sk )
PO (1 + -) = Bi+ 2B41og K + B71og
P0 (1 + I)
F + Belog L
Rearranging terms and renaming parameters
rK bi + b2log K + b3log F + b41log L + XsK
PQ PQ
bIK = bi + b2log K + b31log F + b4log L + XZ
where
rK
UK :
- sK
PQ
the required payments to capital per unit of revenue.
the allowed payments to capital per unit of revenue.
Taking the logarithmic derivative of the trans-log production function
with respect to the fuel input F we get
alog Q = ý3+ 2B61og F + B7log K + Býlog L
31og F
_Q F F
ýF Q F Q
149
(A3-21)
(A3-22)
(A3-23)
(A3-24)
(A3-25)
where ! F =- is the marginal product of fuel.F DF
Substituting (A3-25) into the first order condition for fuel we obtain
ýR _ P( + 1 )f = g (A3-26)TF E
gF (1 + 1 ) [ + 261og F + 871og K + B9log L] (A3-27)
PQ E
rearranging terms and renaming parameters
1F = b3 + b6log K + b7log F + b8log L (A3-28)
where
= gF required payments of fuel per unit of revenue.
ýIF PQ
(A3-24) and (A3-28) form a system of two estimable equations which can
be used to estimate X. All the parameters of these equations are not
functionally independent
b6 ( + )1 7  1+- -+
b3 (1 14 1/ol l-X l-X
b3 = (1 - X)b6 (A3-29)
Equation (A3-29) is a constraint on the two equation system (A3-24),
(A3-28) for factor shares that is determined by the firm's profit max-
imization subject to the regulatory constraint. This constraint can
be therefore used to construct an empirical test of the Averch-Johnson
thesis.
The Averch-Johnson thesis states that a monopoly firm under rate of
return regulation will maximize profits subject to the regulatory con-
straints. If it does it will overcapitalize as proved by (A3-13) above.
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The Averch-Johnson thesis can thus fail to be true for regulated
firms if either or both of the following hold:
i) The regulatory constraint does not enter the firm's Lagrangian
as in (A3-1)
ii) Regulated firms do not maximize profits.
Condition i) implies the testable hypothesis
HI : X = 0
Condition ii) implies the testable hypothesis
H2 : b3 ý (l-X )bs
If both hypotheses are rejected, then the regulated firm maximizes
profits subject to the regulatory constraint and, therefore, the Averch-
Johnson overcapitalization thesis cannot be rejected.
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APPENDIX 4
The Effects of Market Regulation
on Quality of Service
Suppose an industry composed of n firms produces a basic homogeneous
output, transportation, and a secondary output, level of service per unit
of transportation. Assume also that the industry is under market regula-
tion as described in 2.1.1 above and that the regulatory agency sets the
price of transportation at PT. Firms are free to provide any level of
quality but they can only charge PT for transportation regardless of that
level of quality. Entry to and exit from the industry is, of course,
controlled.
The transportation market demand function is then given by:
QT= QT(PT' S) (A4-1)
where
QT is the total quantity of transportation
QS is the average market level of service per unit of transportation
PT is the fixed price of transportation
QT T< 0 > 0
DPT Q S
The profit function for a transport firm is
IT = PTq T - CT T - CSqSq T  (A4-2)
where
qT is the quantity of transportation provided by the particular firm
qS is the firm's level of service per unit of transportation
CT is the unit cost of transport
CS is the unit cost of service
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and we further assume
dCT
dq 
T
dCS
dqS
(A4-3)
(A4-4)
over the relevant range.
If the individual firms are profit maximizers then we have that the
optimum level of service per unit of transportation will be determined by:
dl T Tdq =P C T - CSqT - Csqs -; 0
WhichS T can be rearrangedqS T Sto
Which can be rearranged to:
PT - CT qT
S CS  - T/aqS
And by:
d2Ti a2 T  a2 T 9D
S PT q - CT q - CS
" (P - C - Csqs) 2 qT - 2CsT T S S ZS S9~a9
(A4-5)
T 2 T
S q S CS Sq < 0
- < 0ýqs (A4-6)
Substituting (A4-5)into (A4-6) we get
CS qT  3 qT
9q T/3qS 
~-
S 2T 22qT
"" -T-S -9q 2
S
2C <
S ýqS
( T )qss
(A4-7)
(A4-8)< 0
given that
CS >
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9qT
-> 0
aqS
that is, an increase in unitary quality will result in an increase in
demand for transportation.
Equation (A4-5) gives the equilibrium unitary level of service for
the individual transportation firm. For a monopolist the term 'qT / qS
represents the overall market's response to a marginal increase in quality;
for an oligopolist or a competitor this term represents in addition the
potential of capturing a larger share of the transport market from its
competitors by increasing his level of service.
We therefore have:
A(89qT/ S >0 (A4-9)An
Zim(+qT qS) = + (A4-10)n- + oo
and from (A4-5)
q> 0 
(A4-11)An
kim (q S PT- CT
n ++* = (A4-12)CS
where n is the number of firms in the industry.
Thus, the larger the number of firms in an industry the larger 3qT/3 S
and the individual firm's unitary quality offering will be.
According to this model then, a regulated monopolist will offer a
lower level of quality per ton-Kilometer or per passenger than will a reg-
ulated oligopolistic or competitive transport industry. In the perfectly
competitive case each expands qS to (A4-12) until zero economic profits are
made on each customer; that is until the cost of quality per passenger
(qS-CS) just equals the potential net revenue from transportation. Since
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PT is fixed, all competitive firms will offer the same unitary quality
level qS if we assume identical cost structures.
Since the demand for transportation is positively related to the
level of unitary quality, we can conclude that the more competitive the
industry is the more total primary output it will sell.
If the number of firms in the industry is more than one and price
and/or service collusion is not legally permitted we can approximate the
equilibrium level of service per unit of primary output for the individual
firm by (A4-12). Then for an oligopolistic (or competitive) transport
market we have that
asq 1 > 0 (A4-13)
aPT  CS
Thus, the level of quality of an oligopolistic industry will be directly
proportional to the price allowed by the regulatory agency.
The monopolist's quality response to a price change cannot be a priori
predicted as can be seen by taking total differentials in equation (A4-5)
and solving for dqS/dPT
1 (qT)2 - 9aq T qT
dq _ CS aqS aqS aPT 9qS PT (A4-14)
dPT qT) q2 - T qST-
The denominator of this expression is greater than zero by (A4-8) the
second order condition for a profit maximization. The sum of the two first
terms of the numerator is positive, since (aqT/ 9qS) > 0 and (9qT /P T ) < 0,
but the sign of the third term is indeterminate. If this term is negative
and sufficiently large, then for the monopolist dqS/dPT < 0.
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This could only happen if
a (aqT/as) -S=9 TP ( 32T < 0 (A4-15)aPT  PT qS
that is, if as the price of transportation increases, the demand for
transportation becomes less responsible to quality.
Finally, a decrease in the regulated price will not necessarily
generate an increase in the quantity of the primary output demanded (and
produced). From (A4-1) we get:
dQT aQT aQT aQSdPT aPT QS  aPT  (A4-16)
For an oligopolistic industry the first term is negative and the second
is positive. For a monopolist the first term is negative and the second
is indeterminate. In either case we cannot predict what effect a change
in price will have on total demand.
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APPENDIX 5 - THE EFFECTS OF MARKET REGULATION ON TECHNOLOGICAL
INNOVATION [Bailey (1974)]
This model is based on the thesis developed by Schumpeter (1934)
that while competition (or price regulation) tends to eliminate
economic profits in the long run, the positive economic profits that
it allows in the short run are essential for economic profits in that
they motivate the individual firm to innovate technologically in order
to reduce its costs.
The model is mainly concerned with innovations which reduce the
costs of production and not with new product innovations. We assume
that both the demand for the product and factor prices are constant,
that the innovation process is deterministic and that the length
of the regulatory review period T is non-stochastic. Given these
assumptions we can conclude that the firm's objective is to select
that level of innovative activity which, for a given length of the
regulatory lag T, maximizes its net present discounted stream of
profits. (See Figure A5-1).
Mathematically this can be expressed as:
MAX PV = T [Po - Po - B(I)]]q ertdt - cI (A5-1)
t=O 0
where
Po is the price the regulated firm faces at t = 0, which is
equal to the firm's average cost of production before the
introduction of the innovation.
qo is the output that clears the market at po
c is the unitary cost of innovation at t = 0
r is the cost of borrowed funds to the firm
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T is the length of the regulatory review period
I is the level of innovative input
B(I) is the cost savings per unit time and output for an
innovative input level I
PV is the net present value of the innovative project's cash flow.
The benefits of innovation will last only for the review period T,
that is, until the regulatory agency reduces the maximum allowed price
to the level of the new average cost.
If we normalize po = qo = 1 we can rewrite (A5-1) as
MAX PV = fT B(I)e-rtdt - cI
t= 0
1- rT
r B(I) - cI (A5-2)
The first order condition for a maximum is given by
d(PV) _ 1 - rT dB
" - c = 0 (A5-3)dl r dl
The second order condition is
d 2(PV) 1 -e-rT d2 B < 0 (A5-4)dr d <0 (A5-4)2  r 2dI dl
Condition (A5-4) implies that (d2B/dI2 ) < 0 since r > 0, T > 0;
that is, investment in technological innovation has to exhibit
decreasing returns to scale. The general argument implying that
this is so was given by Machlup (1962) who suggested that as research
becomes more intensive the frontier of available knowledge is approached
and further reductions in production costs become more difficult and
expensive to achieve. The optimum innovation input level I* is
given by:
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dB [I*] cr (A5-5)
dl -rTl-e
By taking the total differential of (A5-3) with respect to I and T
and setting it equal to zero we get:
d [ d-PV) = 1 - e-rT d2 B dl +e-rT dB dT = 0 (A5-6)
dl r dl 2  dl
Rearranging terms
-rTdl _ re dB/dlSrerT dB/d > 0 (A5-7)
1 -e d 2B/d1 2
A decrease in the regulatory review period will therefore result in
a decrease in the technological innovative input. In the limit, if
T = 0 then (A5-1) will be transformed into
Max (-cI) (A5-8)
and the optimum will obviously be I = 0
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APPENDIX 6 - ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN THE PROVISION OF TRANSPORTATION
SERVICES
As we saw in Section 2.2.2 above the shape of a firm's cost
curve and, in particular, the sign of its first derivative over the
relevant volume range are important in determining the existence
of a "natural monopoly" in the particular industry and the consequent
need for imposing government regulation on it.
As it turns out, many transportation activities are characterized
by economies of scale - a doubling of inputs will result in a more
than doubling of output - and, therefore, by decreasing long run
marginal (and average) cost structures. This point is illustrated by
the following example [Mohring (1976)].
The provision of transportation services by a firm can be
represented by the following simplified model. Customers arrive
at the place where the service is provided (railroad classification
yard, bus station, etc.) at a constant rate of n per hour. Production
of the transportation service involves three different types of costs:
@ A fixed cost CF which is independent of the number
of customers served (depreciation of equipment,
driver's or helper's wages, etc.)
* A variable cost per passenger CV which is also
independent of the number of passengers served.
* A delay cost per customer-hour CD which reflects
the amount the average passenger would be willing
to pay to avoid a one hour delay in being served and
the cost for the supplier of providing storage space
during that time.
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If service is provided in batches of N customers, the interval between
batches will be N/n hours and, therefore, the average customer
will wait N/2n hours and will incur a delay cost of NCD/2n.
Thus, the average per passenger total cost of providing the
service in batches of N for the given demand is:
C F  NCD
AC(n,N) = N + CV + -N V 2n (A6-1)
Note that
C CD
N NAC(n,N)] 2n (A6-2)
That is an increase in the size of the batch N will decrease the
fixed cost component of average cost and increase the delay cost
component. By setting (3-15) equal to zero we obtain the optimum
batch size N* for which average cost is minimized.
[AC(n, N)] = 0 - N (2nCF/CD) 2  (A6-3)(A6-3)
Total costs are given by2
N C
TC (nN) CF - NCV + 2n (A6-4)
And marginal costs are
NC
MC(n,N) CV + n (A6-5)
Thus we can also obtain the optimum batch size N* by equating (3-14)
and (3-18)
AC(rN*) = MC(nN*) (A6-6)
N* = (2nCF/CD) 1/2 (A6-7)
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By substituting (3-20) into (3-14) and (3-18) we can obtain the
minimum average and marginal cost of transportation at the given
level of demand.
AC*(n) = (2 CFCD/n) 1/2 + CV  (A6-8)
MC*(n) = (2CFCD/n) 1/ 2 + C
SV (A6-9)
Observe that
dAC (n) dMiC*n) 1 (2CF C/n 3 ) 1/2 < 0 (A6-10)
dn dn 2
Therefore, average and marqinal costs of ;,roviding transpcrtation
services decline with increases in demand volume.
In conclusion, transportation activities are very often character-
ized by economies of scale and decreasing marginal and average cost
structures, thus providing an incentive for the firms that are en-
gaged in the provision of said services to expand their output capacity.
As was discussed in Section 2.2.2 above, the existence of such a
"natural monopoly" situation has very often been used as an economic
rationale for imposing government regulation on an industry.
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